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TMLS CLASHES ON OBSCENITY
honorary scholastic institu-
tions.
The St. Thomas Moore So-
ciety, well known to Loyola's
alumni, gave way this year to
the newer TMSL largely
through the diligent efforts
of Tim Sargent and Fr. Va-
chon. The change, however,
encompassed far more than
just the name. At regularly
scheduled meetings the TMLS
discusses controversial areas
of the law aided by selected
members of the faculty and
the legal profession. Member-
ship, formerly open to the
Should you be even in a remote way allergic to any sen- whole student body, is now on
sation mildly identified with nostalgia, by all means do a selective basis. Numbering
something, ... don't go near the old sidewalk campus, where approximately twenty, the so-
Washingtonias stood as sentinels and gave a local habita- ciety provides a forum for
tion and a name to. the "DId SChDOI" that was Loyola Law leading students to' break the
for a generation of the children of men ... Of course, if monotony of cases, statutes
you don't mind becoming blear-eyed, by all means, drop and notes by going deeper in-
around for a look-see, ... but approach the spot in reverence to' the largely unresolved mod-
for it'll stir up hallowed memories . . . Another victim Df ern issues facing the legal pro-
urban progress, it fought a losing battle with nosing bull- fession.
dozers and smoking black-top ... Even "black acre", that The enthusiasm of the sec-
mythical patch of land that was plowed, tilled, leased, con- ond meeting befitted TMSL's
veyanced and reconveyanced endlessly, provided untold ease- broad purpose. Members of
ments and never failed to' produce a reansttc glow in a trouble- the Black-Douglas school of
some problem of transrerrtng Htle to a 'defaulting taxpayer, thought supported the abso-
is a nameless nothing What WALTER H.... as in lute treedom of speech alleg-
liOHFELD ... COOK didn't do. with it, tor it was as edly guaranteed by the first
pliable as putty in his hands, and he tossed it about with and tourteenth amendments.
the touch of the master ... His career of Mr. Chips spanned "Congress shall make no law
the life of the Grand Avenue Maison ... He made "Read- ... abridging the freedom of
ings orr the Law of Contracts," the Book of the Century and speech," means precisely that
a collectors' item ... None discoursed on "rights, privileges, all speech is protected, and
powers, and immunities" as did he and, when he spoke the cannot be proscribed in any
last syllable of the last word was said with ultimate finality way by the Federal Dr State
... Only two scraggy trees are holding out against the in- Governments. This position
vasion and tufts of foliage at middle height, make them disposes of the problem in
look not unlike flags at half-staff ... In the 'spirit of the short order. Governmental
scene a tear is dropped as the wayward wind whispers a. bodies are powerless to pro-
requiem. This is a spot for memories ... Here was installed hibit the sale of any literary
the "Aggeler Plaque", the tDP award for "superior scholar- materials or the showing of
ship and noteworthy achievement" ... BALDO KRISTOVICH any films, regardless of their
'35 was the first recipient and started. a pageant of celebs content.
that fairly glowed with professional distinction ... BALDO The consensus, however, was
certainly gave it a superb start '.' . Constant occupancy was represented by a mDre mod-
his title to a secluded nook in the library, where, outside erate view. The state and 10-
of Class, he could be found any hour of the day and not in- cal governments should have
frequently, at night, tor well he understood that labor is the some power to restrict the sale
law of life for one who. would prosper in the law ... It's and display of materials in-
too bad thalt a plaque doesn't mark the spot where he made jurious to the community well
histDry, with some such words as, "Dedicated to the memory being. The real problem is
of BALDO KRISTOVICH '35 who did not sleep here." . . . finding some workable sys-
Ilis professional career moves at the same tempo as did his tern providing a free market
student years ... Just now as Public Administrator of Los place for ideas, yet restricting
Angeles County he has the largest probate practice in West- wholesale dealerships in smut.
ern civiltzatton ... and the largess with which he distributes As in the case of most mod-
other people's wealth, makes Croesus and the Golden Boys erate views, there is no. easy
of an opulent elder day look like rank amateurs ... Here, solution.
too, at the homey, compact Maison, ... where character was Mr. Clancy, a veteran of
formed and intellect informed, the O'MELVENY trend was many an obscenity prosecu-
,established, and GEORGE ElMENDORF '43 lost no time in tion, suggested that the pres-
ent status of the law, in ef-
fect, is represented by Chief
By Frank B. Myers covering this controversial
topic and added several reso-
lutions for the nationwide
problem of obscene films and
literature. The round table
discussion that followed didn't
necessarily resolve the proo-
lem. Sparked by varying points
of view, however, it insured
TMSL's future success as one
of Loyola's most prominent
Obscenity and the Courts
provided the focal point for
the newly reconstituted
Thomas Moore Law Society's
second meeting, Saturday,
March 13. Former Assistant
District Attorney James
Clancy opened the discussion
with a review of the case law
(Continued on page 2)
Justice Warren's dissenting
opinion in Jacobellis v. Ohio,
12 L. Ed 2d 793 (1964). In six
separate opinions the U,S. Su-
preme Court reversed an Ohio
conviction based on the show-
ing of the motion picture "The
Lovers." The inability of the
Court to agree on a basis for
reviewing obscenity prosecu-
tions evidences the great con-
fusion in this area. Neverthe-
less, Mr. Clancy suggested that,
as in the words of Warren,
"the use to which various ma-
terials are put-e-not just the
words and pictures themselves
-must be considered in deter-
mining whether or not the
materials are obscene." The
denial of certiorari in numer-
ous state prosecutions indi-
cates that when substantial
evidence on the whole record
supports a jury's finding that
the particular manner of dis-
play of a book or picture is
contrary to the local stand-
ards of decency, the verdict
will be upheld.
In effect, Lady Chatterly's
Lover, or Fanny Hill could ap-
pear in a college book store or
library, but not in a drug store
frequented by innocent child-
ren. The twelve reasonable
men of the jury would decide
obscenity much in the same
manner they decide negli-
gence. Mr. Clancy suggested
that by misreading the cases,
local authorities have backed
up from this very reasonable
position and attempted to. ap-
ply a nonexistant "national
standard."
The discussion left the lim-
its of obscenity and the First
Amendment largely undefined.
Yet, by more precisely defining
the issues involved the TMLS
took a step towards some so-
lution to. the problem. While
polishing their armor tor the'
next clash, the members ex-
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PHI AL'PHA DELTABLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES
(Continued from page 1)
hopping over to 433 So. Spring, as soon as he finished his
comprehensive . . . GEORGE is still there and everybody
involved was happy with the move The way he ad-
ministered the Loyola Bar Association ODRA CHANDLER,
'52, was its President in his Senior Year, it took neither a
prophet nor the son of a prophet to foretell what his par-
ticular interest would be . . . As Mayor of Anaheim, he
governs in his spare hours, the largest growing community
in Southern California and if he could absorb his near
neighbor, Disneyland, there would be no question as to the
accuracy of this reasonable boast . . . All this he is doing
while he discourses with discernment on the "Rule of
Law" ... STEPHEN POWERS, '49, has been doing nobly pro-
viding much of the power and lots of light to the Dept. of
Water & Power, ... no pun intended, ... just facts, ...
was given a leave of absence, to join the trio appointed by
the Regents of the University of California to investigate
how the taxpayers' money is being used to prepare the youth
of today to be the citizens of tomorrow ... From recent
goings-on up Berkeley way, . . . evidence so far makes it
look like an investment gone sour ... RAY ROBERTS, '48,
continues to do the unusual He landed in the Muncipal
Court via the plebiscite route Most extraordinary, ...
and one of the very few judges in this area to achieve this
distinction ... Only a day ago, it seems, he reached the
second plateau in his climb to judicial eminence when he
was robed and inducted into office as a Judge of the Superior
Court ... Another accomplishment for the record books ...
Well, its just one of RAY'S better habits ... and no matter
at what level of the judiciary he's presiding he'll be always
superior . . . Something new has been added to step up the
effective prosecution of mail fraud cases, fraud by wire, and
criminal tax cases . . . This newly created section is re-
ferred to as "Criminal Frauds" . . . To guarantee it the
glow of modernity and to start it out at a highly effective
level, the "something new" is none other than JO ANN
DUNNE, '60, who has sparkled the U.S. Attorney's Office
... Since her graduation from Law School, ... the "cum
Iaude'<on the diploma of MARGARET KELLER, '49, repre-
Phi Alpha Delta Law Fraternity in it's recognized tra-
dition has announced an outstanding program of social and
professional activity for the Spring semester. P.A.D. believes
that a legal fraternity should serve some positive purpose
in the life of each student member. The organization should
do it's part in preparing each neophite lawyer to take his
proper place in the professional community. It is not enough
that the organization act as nothing more than a clearing
house for frivolity. Each student who enrolls in law school
submits himself to the rigors and discipline required to enter
one of this societies highest recognized callings. One of the
requisites of our great profession is sociability, but another
equally important and often overlooked is dignity. P.A.D.
addresses itself to the combination of both of these qualities.
We are not unaware of the criticism of this philosophy that
generates both from without our ranks and even on occasion
from within. In fact, we are grateful for these voices of dis-
sension, that we might be ever conscious of our responsibility
to the serious students of this school. The members of P.A.D.
intend to have a good time and intend to continue to main-
tain an open door policy to those who wish to affiliate with
and serve in a legal fraternity with a sense of responsibility.
It is with these thoughts in mind tha.t P.A.D. prepared for
this Spring semester.
On Saturday, March 27, P.A.D. will host the first Invi-
tational Golf Tournament. Phi Delta Phi has announced that
they will enter a team in competition captained by Jim
Waldorf. Captain for P.A.D. will be Mike Maloney. Individu.al
trophies will be awarded and a perpetual plaque will be
established in the school fraternity room.
The Magic Castle, a private club for the magicians' as-
sociation, will throw open it's doors for the members of
P.A.D. and their guests on the evening of March 28, 1965. An
exquisite dinner and unusual entertainment has been plan-
ned.
sents the Hallmark of quality ... "achievement beyond the provided by Mr. William Tucker, a fraternity brother and
demands of duty ... " MARGARET came down here from member of the faculty.
Wednesday, March 31, finds the fraternity at the famous
Playboy Club for lunch. After-lunch entertainment will be
and professional know-how were the ingredients that went to function in practice. This time we will emphasize crtrni-
into her success formula . . . The measure of her accom- nal courts arid procedure. There will be a tour of the sheriff's
plishment is pretty well gauged by the fact that only recently crime lab and the coronor's office. Open to all P.A.D. mem-
bers and their guests.
Ventura and as soon as she was graduated, hurried back to
her native bailiwick to give it the benefit of her enlighten-
ment . . . She lost no time in establishing a reputa.tion in
legal circles ... Skill, understanding, intelligent sympathy
she was elected President of the Ventura County Bar Associa-
tion and became the first woman so honored in its long and
impressive history . . . Incidentally, her election kept the
Presidency in the Loyola Family, for she succeeds ROBERT
W. FAIRBANKS, '53, who was so determined to become a
lawyer that he left his native Fillmore to study at. Loyola ...
Upon completing the course, he rushed back home a re-
fined country lawyer, dispensing wisdom and culture to the
rich agricultural area of Ventura's hinterland ... Just when
JUDGE KAUS, '49, was beginning to find his way around
the labyrinthine Courthouse, and was more or less oriented
as to the situs of his courtroom, ... he was apprised by the
Governor that his services were required at a higher level
of the judiciary and that he was being appointed to the
District Court of Appeal ... It happened fast but it couldn't
have happened to one more competent and deserving ...
..Not many more plateaus remain before supreme eminence
is attained.
On Wednesday, April 14, P.A.D. will sponsor the third of
a series of tours and lectures to familiarize the law student
with the governmental departments in which he will have
The Annual Initiation of new members and installation
of new officers will be conducted on Friday, April 23, 1965
in Dept. 12, Los Angeles Superior Court. The ceremony will
be followed by a dinner and the presentation of awards.
P.A.D. takes pleasure in announcing another step in a con-
tinuing program of service to the school, the profession and
the student. Upon approval of the faculty and administra-
tion, Phi Alpha Delta-Ford Chapter will present an award
consisting of a set of basic practice codes to the first year
student, both Day and Evening, who achieves the highest
cumulative average during the first year of study. To be
eligible, the recipient. must also be an active member of
Phi Alpha Delta. The selection will be made by the faculty
members of the Fraternity. The award will be presented
each year at the beginning of the Fall semester to the win-
ners of the previous years.
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THOU SHALT NOT MERGE:
,THE SUPREMECOURT AND SECTION 7 OF THE CLAYTON ACT
by .Tames.T.WaldO'rf I
In a series of recent decisions, the Supreme Court of the
United States has extended the errect of the test "may be
substantially to lessen competition" found in Section 7 of
the Clayton Act to encompass almost any merger or business
combination today. While the Court has not taken the po-
sition that any merger is proscribed by the statute, it is a
rare case in which the merger of two companies will not
have some probable effect on future competition to which
Section 7 might be applied. In almost any field of corporate
endeavor, a large business can be operated more efficiently
than a small one. Any businessman is aware that it is often
more expedient to acquire an existing business than to rely
On internal expansion in achieving the growth requirements
of a given enterprise. The task confronting legal counsel in
determining the point at which a client may run the risk
of injunction or judicial divestiture under the anti-trust
laws remains formidable. The outer limits of Section 7 are
by no means clear at this time.
The 1950 Celler-Kefauver amendment of Section 7 was
unquestionably intended to plug the weaknesses of Sherman
Act application to merger cases. The original Section 7 was
applicable only to stock acquisition cases, and the merger
solution offered a loophole to companies threatened with
prosecution. See Swift & CO'.v. Federal Trade Commisston,
272U.S. 554,47 S.ct. 175 (1926) and Arrow-Hart & Hegeman
Elec. CO'.v. Federal Trade Commission, 291 U.S. 587, 54 S.Ct.
532 (1934). The Sherman Act application to merger cases was
seemingly restrtcted to situations of outright monopoly in
the Cofumbla Steel case, United States v. Columbta Steel CO'.,
334 U.S. 495, 68 S.Ct. 1107 (1948), although the Court in
United States v. First Nattonal Bank & Trust CO'.,376 U.S.
665, 84 S.ct. 1042 (1964), has indicated that the Cotumbia
Steel decision "must be confinerl to Its special facts," and
that "where merging companies are major competitive fac-
tors in a relevant market, the elimination of significant com-
petition between them, by merger, itself constitutes a viola-
tion of Section 1 of the Sherman Act." 84 S.Ct. at 1037.
In spite of the possible extension of the Sherman Act which
might be predicated upon the language in the First Na-
ttonal Bank case, the more potent weapon of the govern-
ment in merger cases has been provided by the Supreme
Court under Section 7 of the Clayton Act, which reads in
relevant part:
"That no corporation engaged in commerce shall
acquire, directly or indirectly: the whole or any part
. of the stock or other share capital and no corporation
subject to the jurisdiction of the Federal Trade Com.-
mission shall acquire the whole or any part of the
assets of another corporation engaged also in com-
merce, where in any line or commerce in any sec-
tion of the country, the effect of such acquisition
may: be substantially to lessen competition, or to
. tend to create a monopoly.
"No corporation shall acquire, directly or indirectly,
the whole or any part of the stock or other share
capital and no corporation subject to the jurisdiction
of the Federal Trade Commission shall acquire the
.whole or any part of the assets of one or more corp-
orations engaged in commerce, where in any line
of commerce in any section of the country, the effect
Of such acquisition, of such stocks or assets, or the
use of such stock by the voting or granting of proxies
or otherwise, may be substantially to lessen competi-
tion, or to tend to create a monopoly." (15 U.S.C.
#18).
The legislative intention leading to the amendment of
Section 7 was stated in Brown Shoe CO'.v, United States,
370 U.S. 294, 323, 82 S.Ct. 1502,1522 (1962): "Congress used
the words 'may be substantially to lessen competition' (em-
phasis supplied), to indicate that ilts concern was with prob-
abilities, not certainties. Statutes existed for dealing with
clearcut menaces to competition; no statute was sought
for dealing with ephemeral possibilities. Mergers with a
probable anticompetitive effect were to be proscribed by
the Act."
The first indication of the coming extension of Section 7
was given in United States v. Philadelphia National Bank,
374U.S. 321, 83 S.Ct. 1715 (1963). In that case the Court held
that Section 7 could apply to the merger of the second and
third largest banks in the Philadelphia area notwitnstandtng
the effect of the Bank 'Merger Act of 1960.The Court ignored
strong policy arguments in favor of the merger and con-
centrated on the anticompetitive effect of the combination.
While the Court made a logical application of Section 7, it
was clear at that point that "may be substantially to lessen
competition" would not be confined to the decision in Brown
Shoe, Brown Shoe CO'.v. United States, 370U.S. 294, 82 S.Ct.
1502 (1962).
It should be noted that the holding in Brown Shoe con-
stituted the basis of the District Court decision refusing ap-
plication of Section 7 in each of the four major cases to be
discussed. In each case, the Supreme Court reversed the
District Court and condemned the merger.
In United States v. EI Paso Natural Gas Co., 376 U.S. 651,
84 S.Ct. 1044 (1964), the Court looked at the probable effect
on future competition rather than the effect on competition
which existed at the time of the merger. At the time of the
acquisition of Pacific Northwest, EI Paso was the only out
of state supplier of natural gas. in California. The line of
commerce or relevant product market was properly de-
termined to be natural gas; the relevant geographical market
was California. It was noted that Pacific Northwest had
made several unsuccessful attempts to get into the Cali-
fornia market, and that in the natural gas industry, the
initial installation costs are so high that transactions are
generally few in number and extended over a period of
. several years. "The competttion then is for the new incre-
ments of demand that may emerge with an expanding PO'PU-
Iation and with an expanding industrial or household use
of gas." 84 S.Ct. at 1049.
The Court justifies its decision on the ground that although
Pacific Northwest and EI Paso were not competitors at the
time of the acquisition, Pacific Northwest was the foremost
danger to .eriter the California natural gas market and
challenge EI Paso's supremacy. The removal of such danger
by EI Paso cannot be said to lack anticompetitive implica-
tions. The nature of competition in the area of natural
gas, or other utilities for that matter, is such that it is
eliminated once a contract is Signed. The nature of a utility
is such that it cannot operate efficiently without a large,
ready-made market for its product or service. On the other
side, the utility is in the position of a natural monopoly;
it is more difficult to subject the utility to scrutiny as it
grows larger. Competition, if it is to be maintained at all
in this area, must come initially. For this reason, the eltmi-
(Corrrinued on page 4)
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nation of a major segment of probable future competition
justified the application of Section 7 in this case.
The El Paso doctrine was extended in a novel fashion in
United States v. Penn-Olin Chemical Co., 378 U.S. 158, 84
S.ct. 1710 (1964). This case involved the formation of a new
corporation on the basis of a joint enterprise undertaken
by Pennsalt Chemicals Corporation and Olin Mathieson
Chemical Corporation. The relevant product market was con-
ceded to be sodium chlorate and the geographical market
the Southeast sector of the United States. Penrisalt was en-
gaged chiefly in the production of chemicals, including sodi-
um chlorate, which was produced solely at Portland, Oregon.
Olin was more diversified, and although engaged in the
production of chemicals and chemical products, did not pro-
duce sodium chlorate. Olin had vast sources of distribution,
including the Southeast.
The Court. concluded that Section 7 was intended to apply
to "joint ventures," on the reasoning that Congress had not
intended to create what would otherwise be a significant
loophole. The Court then concerned itself with the task of
finding a probable substantial lessening of competition.
The evidence revealed that Pennsalt had desired to get
into the Southeast market to satisfy the growing need for
sodium chlorate in that region. Olin had been desirous of
producing sodium chlorate, for which it had.a ready market.
The respective desires of the two companies led to the for-
mation of Penn-Olin, whose sole function was the marketing
of sodium chlorate in the Southeast. It should be noted that
prior to formation of the joint enterprise, each company had
been hesitant the Southeast sodium chlorate market alone.
The Court held that the emergence of Penn-Olin in the
market might have foreclosed the possible future competition
of Pennsalt and Olin in the Southeast sodium chlorate mar-
ket. In remanding the case to the District Court, the ma-
jority made it clear that a finding that both companies
would have entered the market was not necessary. Evidence
showing that one of the companies would have entered the
market in question, while the other remained on the thresh-
old as a significant potential competitor would satisfy the
prequisites for invocation of Section 7.
In EI_Paso and Penn-Olin, the determination of the line
commerce and the geographical market was not disputed.
Those cases involved situations in which the ultimate fore-
closure of competition remained conjectural. In the follow-
ing cases, the question will turn on a determination of the
relevant product. and geographical markets, as a basis for
estimating the probable future effect on competition.
In the Alcoa case, United States v. Aluminum Co. of
America, 377 U.S. 271, 84 S.Ct. 1283 (1964), the Supreme
Court refused to sanction the acquisition of Rome Cable
Corpora tion by Alcoa. Rome was engaged primarily in the
manufacture of copper conductor, with about 10% of its
business in the field of aluminum conductor. Alcoa engaged
solely in the manufacture of alminum conductor.
The Court emphasized that the line of commerce evi-
denced highly concentrated markets, dominated by a few
large companies, served also by a small and diminishing
group of independents. In the year prior to, the merger,
Alcoa led the aluminum conductor producers with 27.8% of
the market; Rome was ninth with 1.3% of the market. The
Court noted that Rome was an aggressive competitor, that
its skills had been proven in the field of insulation, and that
Rome had an active and efficient marketing organization.
The conclusion of the Court is ultimately based upon the
condition of competition in the industry, the position of
Rome as a competitor, and the fact that the ninth leading
producer of aluminum conductor would thereby be eliminated,
even though Alcoa's increased share of the market would be
only 1.3%.
The difficulty here, and the subject of a vigorous dissent
by Justice Stewart, joined by Justices Harlan and Goldberg,
concerned the determination of the relevant lines of com-
merce by·the majority.
The aluminum conductor field was broken down into three
segments: (1) bare aluminum conductor, (2) insulated alumi-
num conductor, and (3) the broader field of aluminum con-
ductor, comprised of both bare and insulated aluminum con-
ductor. It was conceded that bare aluminum conductor was
a separate line of commerce. The controversy arose from a
finding by the majority that alminum conductor need not be
combined with copper conductor as a line of commerce, and
that aluminum conductor was a distinct line of commerce.
The dissent notes that, as between the insulated aluminum
conductor and' insulated copper conductor, there is a con-
siderable degree of functional interchangeability. The dis-
sent also states that neither of these products is recognized
as a separate economic entity in the industry. Douglas, for
the majority, points out that there is an absence of cross-
elasticity of price between the two products; where insulated
aluminum conductor can be satisfactorily employed, its cop-
per counterpart is economically unfeasible. The dissent re-
plies with the statement that numerous economic factors in
addition to the cost must be considered.
The majority's position that the bare aluminum conduc-
tor and insulated aluminum conductor could be grouped to-
gether to form a relevant line of commerce is even more
untenable. This is justified on the ground that both pro-
ducts are used to conduct electricity and both are sold to
electrical utilities. The difficulty with this is that these
qualities have not in any way excluded copper conductor.
The inescapeable conclusion which one must reach is that
in spite of any attempts on the part of the majority to dis-
tinguish the copper conductor from the aluminum con-
ductor, the insulated aluminum conductor is more nearly
akin to the copper conductor than to the bare aluminum
conductor in determining a relevant line of commerce under
Section 7.
The only explanation for the result in the Alcoa case is
that the majority gave vent to what it felt was the clear
intention of Congress in amending Section 7, and then de-
veloped a line of commerce to substantiate this result. Stew-
art, in his dissent, made his position on the policy question
equally clear, stating that he felt such a merger merely
constituted a diversification on the part of Alcoa, and as
such, outside the intended scope of Section 7.
The decision in United States v. Continental Can oe., 378
U.S. 441, 84 S. ct. 1738 (1964), left Section 7's "line of com-
merce" test in a state of pure conjecture. The Court here
disapproved the merger of Continental, the largest pro-
ducer of metal containers, with Hazel-Atlas, the third largest
producer of glass containers. The geographichl market con-
cededly being the United States, the principal issue involved
a determination that the combined metal and glass con-
tainer industries constituted a "line of commerce."
Separate lines of commerce were attributed to the metal
container and glass container industries. The difficulty arises
in attempting to correllate the two industries into a broader
and more comprehensive line of commerce. The Court noted
the existence of both interchangeability of use and cross-
elasticity of demand with regard to both industries. It was
also noted that price was only one of the factors affecting
the cross-elasticity of demand, the cost of changing pack-
aging equipment and consumer demands for a particular
type of container with a given product tending to lower the
cross-elasticity of demand Inthese industries. As to this, the
Court said:
(Continued on page 5)
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It would be unfair not to note that the Court in each or
these cases weighed a great many factors in reaching its
Conclusion. It was often emphasized that competitton in the
respective industry was in a state of concentrationtn a few
major companies, and that the companies desiring to merge.
had compiled a history of growth through merger. The cases
have abounded in statistical data, which have been omitted
from our discussion for the most part, all supporting the
contentions of the Court. A hesitancy to accept the validity
of such data cannot be avoided, since statistics are only as
good as the premise upon which they are postulated. The
Attorney General's National Committee to Study the Anti- H:H:H:fIXl-M-J:H:H:H::H)-j~IXl-M-J:H:H:H::H)-j~IXl-M~H:H::H)-j:H:!1IX!-I:H:lM-J:H:H:H::H)-j:H
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"... though the interchangeability of use may not be
so complete and the cross-elasticity of demand not
so immediate as in the case of most intraindustry
mergers, there is over the long run the kind of cus-
tomer response to innovation and other competitive
stimuli that brings the competition between these two
industries within Section 7's competition-preserving
proscriptions."
Extensive interindustry competitaon was cited. While the
evidence was not sufficient to lead to a determination of
just what the area of effective competitton between the
metal and glass container industries comprised, the Court is
quite emphatic that it extends well beyond the finding of
the District Court limiting it in terms of end uses to con-
tainers for beer.
The Continental Can case is a clear illustration of the im-
portance of a realistic determination of the "line of com-
merce." In determining the probability of a substantial lessen-
ing of competition, the Court looks at the competitive fac-
tors which existed immediately prior to the merger or com-
bination. In the Continental Can case, defining the relevant
market to be the metal and glass container industries, it
was found that Continental accounted for 21.9% of the
market, while Hazel-Atlas'was responsible for 3.1% of the
market. As such, Continental ranked second and Hazel-Atlas
ranked sixth. This is the basis for the Court's conclusion
.that the merger would result in a probable substantial
lessening of competition. The percentages in the instant case
would probably be insignificant if the Court had found that
the relevant market consisted of an even broader container
market, including not only metal and glass, but also plastic,
paper, and several other possible types of container. In this
broader line of commerce, the effect on competition here
would probably have been negligible. The instant case is dis-
tinguishable from Alcoa on the basis that neither of the
parties to the merger here manufactures the product of the
other party, whereas Rome did engage to some extent in
the production of aluminum conductor.
The only safe conclusion which one can draw from the
recent cases is that the Supreme Court is making a policy
determination to the effect that any merger between corp-
orations of significant size must withstand a very broad ap-
plication of Section 7 of the Clayton Act.
In the EI Paso and Penn-Olin cases, the Court went a step
beyond the certainty theretofore required in finding a prob-
able lessening of substantial competition in the future. In
the Alcoa and Continental Can cases, the Court determines
.the relevant market to be that which conveniently brings the
merger within the ambit of Section 7. In the latter cases,
the proposed merger consisted of absorption by a leader in
one field of an established producer in a complementary
field. In the Penn-Olin case, each of the participating' com-
panies had entered an entirely new segment of competitive
endeavor. It could be argued that the "joirrt enterprise" in
that case tended to increase competition rather than stifle it.
trust Laws took this approach to the considerations to be
made under Section 7:
"This analysis required by Section 7 is no more
beyond the competence of the courts than the Fed-
eral Trade Commission. For both, the following mar-
ket factors may be helpful in determtning the com-
petitive consequences of any particular acquisition.
We do not, of course, imply that all, several, or any
one of these guides may be significant or even rele-
vant in a given case.
"It may be relevant, however, to study: (1) The
character of the acquiring and the acquired com-
pany, (2) the characteristics of the markets affected,
(3) immediate changes in the size and competitive
range of the acquiring company and in the adj ust-
ments of other companies operating in the markets
directly affected, and (4) probable long-range dif-
ferences that the acquisition may make tor com-
panies actually or potentially operating in these mar-
kets." A.G.N.C.Report 124-125 (1955).
Allen A. Dobey, Chief of the Antitrust Division's General
Litigation Section has stated that the significance of the
recent cases is that the Supreme Court intends to enforce
Section 7 in accordance with the legislative intent as ex-
pressed in the Committee reports and other legislative his-
tory. "And that intent is stronger than the language of
Section 7 itself." The legislative history suggests a ban on
the acquisition of any firm of "economic significance." 33
U.S.L.W.2147.
No one can predict with any great certainty the limits to
which the Supreme Court will eventually ascribe to Section
7. Two interesting District Court cases which may prove
noteworthy in the future are United States v. Pabst Brew-
ing Co., 233 F.Supp. 475 (U.S.D.C.,E..Wis.,1964) and United
States v, Von's Grocery Co., 233 F.Supp. 976 (U.S.D.C.,S.
caur., 1964).
The words of Justice Harlan, dissenting in Continental
Can, (Justice Harlan dissented in each of the recent Section
7 cases), best serve to summarize the status of the law un-
der Section 7 of the Clayton Act as it stands today: "The
Court's spurious market-share analysis should not obscure
the fact that the Court is, in effect, laying down a "per se"
rule that mergers between two large companies in related
industries are presumptively unlawful under Section 7." He
goes on to say: "I have no idea where Section 7 goes from
here, nor will businessmen or the antitrust bar ... Here-
after, however slight (or even nonexistent) the competitive
impact of a merger on any actual market, businessmen rest
uneasy lest the Court create some 'market,' in which the
merger presumptively dampens competition, out of bits and
pieces of real ones."
EASTER
GREETINGS
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BAIL A Need For Reform- -
By Joseph E. DiLoreto
The bail system in the United States determines whether
an accused person in a criminal proceeding shall be released
or jailed for the interim period between arrest and trial. In
the typical case, the accused is brought by the police before
a magistrate or judge who advises the accused of his rights
and who, in the exercise of his discretion sets the bail in
a monetary amount. The legal theory underlying this pro-
cedure is that bail is sufficient to insure the appearance of
the accused at the judicial trial. If he is financially able to
post the bail or hire a bondsman to post it for him he will
be released, if not he must remain in jail until the trial.
Each ear, the freedom of thousands of persons charged with
various crimes hinges on their actual ability to raise the
necessary money to meet the bail. Those who go free do so
not because they are innocent of the charge but because
they can financially afford to purchase their freedom. The
balance who are detained remain in jail not because of their
guilt but simply because they are too poor. The tragedy of
this system is that the indigent accused, who may have come
in contact with the law for the first time must be detained
until the date of trial, while many habitual offenders who
may be more dangerous to the community gain their re-
lease through posting bail.
History of Bail in America
The United States Constitution does not specifically grant
a right to bail. The Eighth Amendment states only that
"Excessive bail shall not be required." Prior to the ratifica-
tion of the Bill of Rights, Congress had provided in the
Judiciary Act of 1789that "upon all arrests in criminal cases,
bail shall be admitted, except where the punishment may
be death." It continued and stated that bail in Capital
Cases would be discretionary depending upon the nature and
circumstances surrounding the crime and the evidence ad-
duced." ~
In the everyday administration of criminal justice in
American courts, the legal rights of the accused to his pre-
trial freedom depend soley upon the completion of the com-
mercial bail transaction. As early as 1912,the Supreme Court
recognized that the bondsman's interest to produce the body
of the principal in court is impersonal and wholly pecumary."
At the same time the accused's right to bail in noncapital
cases was steadfastly defined, as Justice Jackson pointed out
.in Stock v. Boyle;"
From the passage of the Judiciary Act of 1789 . . .
to the present Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
... the Federal law has unequivocally provided that
a person arrested for a non-capital offense shall be
admitted to bail. This traditional right to freedom
before trial permits' the unhampered preparation
of a defense, and serves to prevent the infliction of
punishment prior to convention ... unless this right
to bail before trial is preserved, the presumption of
innocense, secured only after centuries of struggle
would lose its meaning. '
The American judges' discretion in setting pretrial bail in
noncapital cases has consistently been intrepreted to allow
latitude in setting the amount of bail. This primary propo-
sition was pointed out in Stock v. Boyle:+
The right to release before trial is conditional upon
the accused's giving adequate assurance that he will
stand trial and submit to sentence if found guilty ...
Like this ancient practice of securing the oaths of
responsible persons to stand as sureties for the ac-
cused, the modern practice of requiring a bail bond
or the deposit of a sum of money subject to for-
feiture serves as additional assurance of the presence
of an accused ... Since the function of bail is limited,
the fixing of bail for any individual defendant must
be based upon standards relevant to the purpose of
assuring the presence of the defendant.
It ca~ be then restated, that the development of bail in
the Umted States has for a single purpose the release of
the accused with the assurance he will' return at the date
of trial. It may not be used to' detain the accused through
the setting of excessive amounts, and its continual validity
when the accused is indigent or otherwise a pauper now may
be drawn into question.
The Cost of Detention.
Those who cannot afford a bondsman generally remain
in jail. Their loss of freedom is based upon no rational
criteria, but upon their inability to raise the cash premium
or to furnish the required collateral. A resolution adopted
by the National Association of Attorneys General on July 3,
1963stated:
Many persons accused of crimes are incarcerated for
various periods of time because of their inability to
post bail, although often not indicted for the crime
or later found not guilty after trial, resulting in loss
of liberty, separation from families and loss of em-
ployment as well as expense to the state in the cost
of confinement (and) relief for dependents.
These costs of pretrial imprisonment in the United states,
in terms of time, money, and human suffering are staggering.
In fiscal year 1960, 23,811persons accused of federal of-
fenses were held in custody pending trial. The average length
of their detention was 25.3 days.' Detention ranged for a
Iowa verage of 2 days in some districts to a high average of 110
days in others.s In 1963those persons detained within federal
confines spent an estimated 600,000jail days in local prisons,
at a cost to the federal government of $2,500,000.In a re-
cent study conducted by the New York Bar Association the
localized cost to selected large .citdes was uncovered. In St.
Louis the average cost of detaining one accused was $2.56
per day, $2.61 in Atlanta, $3,82in Washington, D.C., $4.25 in
Philadelphia, $4.28 in Chicago, $6.25 in New York and $6,86
in Los Angeles. These figures reflect only the variable costs
such as food, clothing, supervision, and medical care. These
figures in no way reflect the fixed costs,' items' like con-
struotion and maintenance of buildings, a~d the alternative
use the facilities could be put to. .
. More important than the economic burden on the taxpayers
IS the personal toll upon the detained and his family. His
home may be disrupted, his family humiliated, his relations
with his wife and children unalterably affected. The man
who goes to jail for failure to make bond is treated in al-
most every case and in every jurisdiction as a convicted
criminal serving a sentence. In the words of Jones V. Ben-
nett, Director of the United States Bureau of Prisons.'
When a poor man is arrested, he goes willy-nilly to
the same institution ,eats the same food and suffers
under the same hardships as he who has been con-
victed of a crime. The well-to-do, the rich, and the
influential on the other hand find it requires only
money to stay out of jail, at least until they have had
their day in court.
Alternatives to the Bail System.
1. Manhattan Bail Project.
In the fall of 1961,the Vera Foundation's Manhattan Bail
Project pioneered the fact findings process in New York City
by launching a program in conjunction with the Felon Di-
vision of the Magistrate Court. Assisted by the Ford Founda-
tion grant of $115,000and staffed by New York University
law students under. the supervision of a. Vera Foundation
director, the project interviewed approximately 30 newly ar-
rested felony defendants each morning prior to arraignment.
The accuseds for the most part were indigents who would
be represented by counsel appointed by the court. The students
obtained information relating to employment, family resi-
dence, and prior record. A point system was used to ev~luate
these factors and arrive at a recommendation, For each de-
fendant determined by the project to be a good parole risk,
1. J Stat. 73, 91 (1789); Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524 (1952).
2. Leary v. Untted States, 244 U.S. 567, 575 (1912).
3. 342 U.S. 1,4 (1951).
4. Ibid.
5. Advisory Committee's Note to Rule 46, Second Preliminary Draft of Proposed
Amendments to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure (1964)
6. Survey of United States Attorneys (1964); Attorney General's Committee Re-
port p. 65.
7. Address, February 24, 1939.
(Continued on page 7)
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a summary of the survey was sent to the court reccomending "Enthusiasm is running after the game. There were
parole. If parole was decreed then the project staff remains amok!" grunts, groans, and screams of
in touch with the defendant and sees that he is reminded Phi Delta Phi, in its con- foul among a group of ap-
of his obligation to appear in court on the trial date. cern for academic excellence, proximately 100 students who
Up to date, a total of 2,630persons have been so released. offered a seminar program didn't .reel that they could
Of these only 24 have failed to appear. Thus the efficency that succeeded in probing and field a representative team of
of the system has demonstrated a record of over 99 per cent exploiting the intellectual cap- 5 players. They decided that
appearance at trial. The financial savings to the city in not abilities of its pledges. This was defaulting under these cir-
having to support these persons in jail is substantial; how- not a "one shot deal," but a cumstances was "the better
ever the financial benefit to the individuals themselves and continuous program through- part of valor."
their families in not being kept from gainful employment is out the semester and was well Approximately 25 PDP men
much greater, and the human benefit to them and their attended and richly rewarding participated in intra squad
families is incalculable. to the participants. games that afternoon. Four
2. Release on Recognizance. During this time the social full teams were formed, and
Once the facts about the accused's community roots are personality of the fr~ternity lay everyone drank beer and play-
known, the court is in a positlon to individualize the bail dormant. But it has since ex- ed basketball. Not one PAD
decision. Increasing attention has been given in recent years ploded with a fury that has strayed into the gym that aft-
to opportunities for the widespread release of defendants left outsiders trembling en- ernoon. This was unfortunate,
on their own recognizance; their promise to appear without viously in its wake. Phi Delta because these people who ab-
any further security. A great many state and federal courts Phi believes, and rightly so, hor physical exercise were de-
have long employed this device to allow pretrial freedom that physical fitness is woe- prived of a meal at Scarppo-
for defendants whom the court or prosecutor personally know fully neglected in law school. lito's that Tom Jones would
to be reliable or "prominent" citizens. But for the past three Students, in their pursuit of have enjoyed; spaghetti, ravi-
years we have seen the practice extended to many defendants knowledge, engage in all forms oli, pizza and an unlimited
who cannot raise bail. The Manhattan Bail Project has of mental gymnastics, but supply of beer. Even Dick Pi-
demonstrated that a defendant with roots in the community physical exercise is discarded antadosi was full.
is not likely to flee, irrespective of his lack of prominence as an undesirable infringe- There was a subsequent
or ability to pay a bondsman. To date, these projects have ment on their precious time. feeble attempt from the other
produced remarkable results, with vast numbers released, The fraternity has attempted group that should not go un-
few defaulters and scarcely any commissions of crime by, in some small way, to rectify mentioned. PAD tried to
parolees in the interim between release and trial. this situation by encouraging eradicate the stigma of their
3. Summons in Lieu of Arrest the participation of both tra- default and shame by chal-
By definition, release on recognizance is a device to restore ternities in athletic activities. lenging PDP to a golf tourna-
the liberty of an accused who has been arrested and brought There is a triology of sports ment. The fraternity would
before a magistrate. To the extent that such releases can by which the fraternity at- not stoop to engage in a "tit-
be granted in large numbers and with small risk of default, tempts to effectuate this pur- for-tat" default and decided
they suggest that-in certain offenses and for appropriate pose:' football, basketball, and to support a representative
defendants-the arrest process. might be avoided altogether. softball. (Beer vollyball, and team. There was talk of a
To bypass arrest and bail in less serious offenses, extended skimpily clad nymphs of the joint party after the game, to-
use of the summons or citation has long been urged. Basically, sea will contribute to fur- gether with the presentation
these devices are orders issued by a judge or police officer ther physical stimulation dur- of trophies. Splendid idea, but
to the accused, directing him to appear in court at a desig- ing the summer.) Part two of it was ill timed and too late.
nated time for hearing or trial. Recently the Attorney Gen- this program went into effect The enthusiasm of PDP for
eral's Committee endorsed the summons for "those cases in this semester when Phi Delta mixed parties has been rudely
which an arrest is not required to protect the proper rune- Phi challenged Phi Alpha,Del- snuffed out.
tioning of the criminal process.?s ta to a basketball game. The (Editor's note; Golly gee!!
Although approximately 28 states and the federal courts fraternity, in its naive but I bet that taught those dirty
have statutory provisions for judicially issued summons in well-meaning way, thought guys from PAD a lesson).
lieu of warrants, or for police citattonsJn lieu of sight ar- that the activity would be en- The social juggernaut
rests, their use is presently limited largely to traffic of- thusiastically received. The re- marches on.
tenses and violations of municipal codes and county ordi- sponse was shocking and frus- Realizing the importance of
nances. Yet in a variety of situations involving minor crimes trated any attempt to engage moments of levity in Loyola's
or misdemeariors, estimated to constitute over 90% of all the rival fraternity in a test pressure cooker, the fraternity
American crime, the comparatively small likelihood that the of athletic strength. But most, has sponsored two exchanges,
defendarit will flee suggests little need to invoke the arrest important, both were deprived both have been raucously sue-
process with its consequent reliance on bail. of the opportunity to mingle
Conclusion together in a social setting
'Studies dissecting the bail system have been conducted
for a good many years. Their uniform conclusion is that the
system has not worked in an equitable manner. Accused per-
Sons in large numbers in all parts of the country are forced
to spend the interval between arrest and trial in jail. Most
are detained only because they cannot pay the bondsman'S
premium or put up the collateral he asks. They lose their
jobs and their family life is disrupted. Their chances for
acquittal are lowered; their opportunities for probation di-
minished; their quest for equal justice handicapped ..
The trouble with the present system is that by relying' on
the false security of money, too many poor are needlessly
detained; it also protects too little against the dangerous.
The recent decisions of the Supreme Court concerning the
indigents right to counsel both at the trial and theappelate
levels indicate that a man's financial position does not de-
termine his position of equal protection under the law.
PHI DELTA PHI
(Continued on page 13)
8, Attorney General's Committee Report p. 74; Report of the National Com-
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An unusual Petition for Re-
hearing was filed before the
Supreme Court of California.
This petition, filed September
15, 1964, was exceptional in
that it was signed by no less
than the California Attorney
General, three deputies At-
torney General, fifty-six Dis-
trict Attorneys, one hundred
ninety-four Chiefs of Police
and the Sheriffs of thirty-nine
counties. The Supreme Court
was quick to act and on Sep-
tember 24, 1964, granted a re-
hearing.v
.The case that aroused such
furor among the law enforce-
ment and prosecutional agen-
cies of this state-was People v.
Dorado, 61 A. C. 892, 40 Cal.
Rptr. 264, 329 P.d 952 (1964),
vacated, 62 A.C.-, 42 Cal. Rptr.
169 (1965).
The events leading up to
this furor and ensuing petition
were as follows. Robert B. Do-
rado, age 26, was serving a life
term in San Quentin Prison
for the sale of marijuana. Ac-
cording to prison officers, they
discovered on December 12,
1961, the body of Navarez in
the the lower prison yard be-
hind some bleachers. Navarez
died 20 minutes later from
multiple stab wounds in the
chest. Suffice it to say that all
evidence led directly to Do-
rado. _.
Approximately an hour
later, between 9:00 and 10:00
A.M., officers brought Dorado,
into the office of Captain
Hocker, and official of San
Quentin Prison. In order to
examine the defendant for
superficial cuts and scratches
which might have been in-
flicted in the fatal skirmish,
Captain Hocker requested de-
fendant to strip to the waist.
After he had dressed, he was
shown a blood stained' jacket
with his name on it found near
the scene of the crime.· He
made no comment. Captain
Hocker then requested Officer
Glacier to take defendant to
the hospital laboratory in
order that a technician might
remove and test some brown
flecks on defendant's hands
which appeared to be dried
blood. After defendant's re-
turn about an hour later, Mr.
Midyet from the district at-
torney's office arrived.
Mr. Midyet and Captain
;Hq<::~_ertestifled at _the trial
that early in the afternoon less that right is intelligently circumstances the introduc-
in the course of an irrter'roga- waived. In laying down this tion into evidence of state-
tion lasting about two hours, rule the court relied heavily ments obtained from a de-
defendant confessed the kill- on such recent Supreme Court fendant during police inter-
ing. More confessions and in- of the United States' decisions rogation in violation of his
terrogations followed in the as: Escobedo v. State of Hli- right to counsel and his
next two days. nois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964); right to remain silent may
Note that by the time of Massiah v. United States, 377 constitute harmless error,
confession eliciting interroga- U. S. 201 (1964); Gideon v. we are convinced that the
tion, the forces of the state Wainwright, 372 U. S. 335 error is necessarily preju-
had been marshalled against (1963), and Carnley v. Coch- dicial when the statements
Dorado. Investigation pro- ran, 369 U. S. 506 (1962), The are conresstons."
ducing evidence of defendant's Court made clear that any in- The only ray of consolation
guilt had been conducted. De- criminating statements elici- for law enforcement officials
fendant had already been ted from defendant after in- to come from the California
searched and interrogated vestigation is focused upon Supreme Court on that day
once. Not only the officer him but before he has been was in a decision in a different
questioned him at the interro- clearly made aware of his case, In re Lopez, 62 A.C.-, 42
gation in which defendant right to have counsel and to Cal. Rptr. 188 (1965). In a well
ultimately confessed, the dis- remain silent must be exclud- written and reasoned opinion
trict attorney was there too. ed from evidence and failure by Justice Tobriner, the court
The evidence as to what to so exclude will result in, held that the rule extending
methods were used to obtain automatic reversal. right to counsel to pre indict-
defendant's confession was Thus arose the furor and ment interrogation was not to
highly conflicting. The trial fear among police and prose- be applied retroactively on
court found the confessions to cutors. They screamed "crimi- collateral attack.
be voluntary, admitted them nal coddling" and "unwork- Law enforcement and prose-
into evidence and found de- able rule." When the rehear- cutional agencies have at-
fendant guilty of malicious as- ing was granted, law enforce- tacked the Dorado decision on
sault with a deadly weapon ment sighed and awaited its three grounds and compli-
resulting in a fellow prisoner's redemption from this tempo- mented it on one. They con-
death, a crime for which there rary aberration. When the re- tend:
is an automatic penalty of deemer arrived, he was not all I. The decision is not historic-
death." Penal Code Section that could be imagined from ally justified.
1239, sub. (b), provides tor an the prophets' description. II. The decision is without
automatic appeal. On January 29, 1965, came American legal precedent.
The California Supreme not the redeemer but instead III. The decision will seriously
Court, on August 31, 1964, a Massiah and an Escobedo. impair law enforcement and
handed down its decision re- 'The court vacated its August handcuff the police in their
versing the conviction. It ac- opinion and held unequivocal- inve,stigations.
cepted the trial court's de- ly as follows: IV. Then the attackers sigh,
termination that the confes- We conclude, then, that the "Well, at least its not retro-
sions were not coerced. The defendant's confession could active."
following was enough for the not properly be introduced While there is room for in-
Supreme Court: into evidence because (1) telligent difference of opinion,
At the trial Captain HO'2k- the investigation was no the four premises of the law
er testified that he not only longer a general inquiry in- enforcement agencies are
initially interrogated the de- to an unsolved crime but founded on what the writer
fendant but had been pres- had begun to focus on a par- believes to be misconceptions.
ent during the major part of ticular suspect, (2) the sus- The rest of this article is de-
defendant's interrogation by pect was in custody, (3) the voted to support of and com-
members of the district at- authorities had carried out ment on the California Su-
torney's office. He further a process' or interrogations preme Court's decision.
testified that he did not at that lent itself to eliciting
any time inform defendant incriminating statements,
of his right to counselor of (and) (4) the authorities
his right to remain silent. had not effectively informed
He did not hear anyone else defendant of his right to
so inform the defendant; counselor of his absolute
. Mr. Midyett testified to the right to remain silent, and
same ~ffect.3 no evidence establishes that
The court ruled that once he had waived his rights:'
officers have focused an in- The fact that evidence apart
vestigation upon a particular from appellant's statements to
person, they must affirmative- the police almost conclusively
ly advise him of his right to estabilished his guilt was held
counsel and of his right to re- not to alter this result.
main silent. The court further
declared that his constitution-
al right to counsel' precludes
the use of incriminating state-
ments elicited by police during
accusatory investigation un-
It is undoubtedly true, as
the attackers contend, that
the founding fathers at the
adoption of the U. S. Consti-
tution would not have in-
terpreted the Sixth Amend-
ment right to .counsel to ex-
In Defense of Dorado
By .John F. Harris
1. Cragen, DorCido Revisited-Decision
Defended, Hastings College of Law
(Hastings), Nov. 30, 1964, p, 5, col. 1,
2, Cal. Penal Code Section 4500.
3. People o, D01'ddo, 61 A.C 892, 894,
Finally, we cannot dispose 40 Citl. Rptr. 264, 265 (1964) (opin-
of the introduction of the ion vacted).
illegally obtained confession 4, People v. Dorado, 62 A.C ---,
42 Cay. Rptr. 169, 179 (1965).
upon the ground that is 5.u. at 180-181.
constituted merely harmless
error. Although under some
THE DECISION IS
HISTORICALLY JUSTIFIED
(Continued on page 10)
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Dissent From Dorado asked to see his attorney, who
at that moment was at the
police desk requesting that he
be permitted to speak to his
The case of PEOPLE V. DO- client. It was not until ques-
RADO, 62 A.C. 350, decided by tioning of Escobedo had ended
our State Supreme Court last and he had admitted complier-
January, has b~en termed one ty in his brother-in-taw's slay-
o~ . the .most important de- ing, that he was allowed to
CISIOl~S in the .crImma~ law consult his lawyer, Because
area m recent times. Prior to the lawyer had previously told
DORADO, one accused of a I' him not to make a any state-
crime had the right to an at- ment, Escobedo's confession
torney under the United was ruled voluntary He was In DORADO, the defendant
States Constitution from the sentenced to 20 years' for first- had appealed from a judge-
moment of his indictment. Be- degree murder. ment of conviction for murder,
fore formal indictment, police Ona eal to . and a death penalty. Dorado
officials could qeustion a sus- pp 0 the Umted was serving a life sentence in
.. States Supreme Court the S Q ti P' .pect m private. They were '. . ,an uen in rison for sellmg., . convictton was reversed in a " I D b funder no obligation to mform 5-4 decisio Th iortt marijuana. ' n ' ecem er 0
the suspect of his Constitu- . 1 n. e majori Y held 1961 one Nevarez, a fellow in-
that "where as h th'tional right to counsel until ...' ere, e in- mate, was found stabbed to
., vesttgation IS no longer a gen- d th i the nrl d Uthe interrogation was over and, . . , ea in e prison yar. p-
a . di ttl d d Ad eral inquiry mto an unsolved on investigation, officers dis-
n In IC men 0 ge. ,- crime but h besr t fmissions of guilt prior to in- , . as egun 0 ocus covered a blood-stained blue
dictment were admissible in on a partIcular suspect, the denim jacket with the prison
evidence as long as the ad- suspect has been taken into identification number cut out,
mission was a voluntary one. I but the name "Dorado" was on
Under DORADO, the right to I the pocket. The officers 10-
counsel now matures at the cated the defendant in his cell,
"accusatory stage" of the po- ' and under a stack of clothing
lice investigation, which may they found the defendant's
or may not precede the indict- bloodsatined trousers. On the
merit, A defendant has a defendant's hands were brown
Constitutional right to an at- flecks, the dried blood of the
torney and must be informed inmate Dorado had stabbed to
of this right at the moment death. Later, an accomplice of
"the investigation is no longer Dorado admitted he held Ne-
a general inquiry into an un- varez while Dorado time and
solved crime, but has begun to again stabbed Nevarez in the
focus on this particular sus- stomach and chest.
pect." Any incriminating Dorado was brought to the
statements made by the de- office of an official of San
fendant, whether voluntary or Quentin, and questioned con-
not, during the accusatory stage cerning the crime. The de-
of the investigation, where fendant was shown the blood-
the accused was not informed stained jacket which bore his
of his right to counsel, are to name, and when told that
be inadmissible at the de- Nevarez was dead, the de-
fendant's trial. A confession fendant wept. Dorado then
under such circumstances is freely admitted his guilt be-
a confession acquired in viola- fore he had been formally in-
tion of the defendan's Consti- dicted.
t.utional right to an attorney. The trial found that the
The Dorado opinion relied ROBERT B. DORADO, confession of the defendant
heavily upon the recent center of legal storm. was not coerced. On appeal,
United states Supreme Court. the supreme court of this
dectsion of ESCOBEDO V. .pollce custody, the police carry state in a 6-3 decision ac-
ILLINOIS, 378 U.S. 478. Danny out a process of interrogation cepted this finding, but never-
Escobedo, a 20-year-old Mexi- that lends itself to eliciting theless overturned the con-
can laborer, was arrested in incriminating statements, the ,viction relying on the ESCO-
1960 in connection with the suspect has requested arid BEDO case,
murder of his brother-in-law. been denied an opportunity to Prior to the defendant's ad-
Within 12 hours of his arrest consult with his lawyer and missions of guilt, Dorado was
Escobedo had been released the police have not effecbyely not warned of his constitu-
persuant to a writ of habeas warned him of his absolute tional right to remain silent,
Corpus obtained by Escobedo's constitutional right to remain and of his right to counsel.
lawyer. He had made no in- silent, the accused has been When Dorado was first ques-
criminating statements to the denied the 'Assistance of tioned, "the investigation
Police. Counsel' in violation of the ceased to be a general inquiry
Over one week after his re- Sixth Amendment to the into an unsolved crime and
lease, Escobedo was again ar- Constitution as made obliga- had begun to focus on the
rested and questioned. While tory upon the States by the defendant." It was at this time
being questioned Escobedo, Fourteenth Amendment, .arid] Dorado's onstitutional rtghts
By Donald Parrish
no statement elicited by the
police during the interrogation
may be used against him at a
criminal trial." The court went
on to say "it would exalt form
over substance to make the
right to counsel, under these
circumstances, depend on
whether at the time of the
interrogation, the authorities
had secured a formal indict-
ment."
Page Nine
matured. At the commence-
ment of the interrogation the
accusatory stage of the inves-
tigation had been reached.
In failing to inform Dorado
of his Constitutional right to
an attorney and of his right
to remain silent, the Court
said admissions of the defend-
ant as to his guilt and the de-
fendant's account' of the crime
should not have been admitted
into evidence. Under these
circumstances, "the prosecu-
tion cannot introduce into
evidence defendant's own in-
criminating words." If they
are so used, the result is a
denial of due process' under
the Fourteenth Amendment of
the United States Constitu-
tion, and a new trial must .be
granted regardless of the
other evidence of guilt. Im-
properly introducting incrimi-
nating statements of the de-
fendant, obtained in violation
of his Constitutional right to
counsel by failing to inform
the accused of this right prior
to his admission of guilt, tran-
gresses the protection of due
process no less than illegally
introducing a coerced con-
fession. In either case, the
Court said, appeUate courts
cannot inquire into the preju-
dicial nature of introducing an
illegally obtained confession.
Guilty or not, the defendant
must be given a new trial.
Until the rule of DORADO
and ESCOBEDO has been
more fully defined in the
courts, precisely what "ac-
cusatory stage" of the investi-
gation means must be left
somewhat to speculation.
Many writers fear that the
rule is very broad, and may
result in a Constitutional
duty imposed upon law en-
forcement officials to inform
a suspect of his right to an
attorney and his right to re-
main silent long before the
actual arrest and interroga-
tion. As analyzed by Attorney
General of this state, the rule
will of necessity do away with
undercover agents who now
form a vital part of every
large city police force. Justtce
White observes in his dissent
to ESCOBEDO that the rule
is "wholly unworkable and im-
possible to administer unless
police cars ate equipped with
:[j'Ublic defenders and under-
(Continued on page 12)
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tend to preindictment inter-
rogation. There is a reason ror
this. Police Investigatron, at
least as we know it today,
was not then existent.
It may surprise those who
seldom drive a mile without
seeing a policeman, but there
were virtually no police in the
colonies. Indeed, of the origi-
nal thirteen states, not one is
known to have had a police
force and only a few had
prosecutors. The towns and
cities did have constables and
magistrates, but these were
mostly old men taking advan-
tage of an elder day version of
the Great, Society pension.
Constables and magistrates
seldom made arrests except
pursuant to the fresh pursuit
by private citizens after a hue
and cry. They had almost no
investigative PDWer and were
subject to suit for false arrest
if they made a mistake.
The investigation of crimes
committed outside the pres-
ence of witnesses was at best
a haphazard and casual pro-
cess. A person who suspected
a particular man of a crime
could if he was that inter-
ested; privately conduct an in-
vestigation, using private in-
vestigators and orrering a
usually privately donated re-
ward. Having assembled the
evidence, he would present it
himself before a grand jury
which might return an indict-
ment. Even if an indictment
was returned and an arrest
made, our industrious private
citizen often continued to' play
a maj or role in the prosecu-
tion. Frequently, the private
complainant was allowed to
choose the attorney he wished
to act as prosecutor. He could
choose the state or county
prosecutor if there was one, Or
he could and often did choose
a private attorney in whom he
he had confidence. This prac-
tice was common here in Los
Angeles well into the first
quarter of this century." When
a public prosecutor was used.
he was looked upon primarily THE DECISION IS AMPLY
as representing the private SUPPORTED BY AMERICAN
claimant in the name of the JUDICIAL PRECEDENT:
state. Hence, the famous movie In Gideon v. Wainwright,
line "I'll withdraw the 372 U. S. 335,341 (1963), the
cha~ges." Today, the district court held the right to counsel
attorney answers, "I'm sorry, to be one of "those guarantees
it's out of your hands. It is of the Bill of Rights which are
the People of the State of I fundamental safeguards of
California who are prosecuting liberty immune from federal
this action." abridgement by virtue of the
In the early days of our Sixth Amendment and equally
nation, since both the com- protected against state in-
plain ant and the defendant vasion by the Due Process
were looked upon as private Clause of the Fourteenth
parties and the violation of Amendment."
IN DEFENSE OF DORADO "
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the rights of the defendant by
complainant's overzealous in-
vestigation could be remedied
in a civil tort action, the
courts did not find it necessary
to scrutinize the methods by
which evidence was obtained
or to regulate the investiga-
tion of crime.
"It was not until the second
quarter of the 19th century
that a modern police torce
arose charged with the in-
vestigatlon of crime in the
name or the state."!
Escobedo v. State of Illinois,
78 U. S. 478 (1964), was simply
an application of the Gideon
rule to the pre indictment
stage of the criminal process,
The u:nited States Supreme
Court held that "where, as
here, the Investigation is no
longer a general inquiry into
an unsolved crime but has be-
gun to focus on a particular
suspect, the suspect has been
taken into police custody, the
police carry out a process or
interrogations that lend itself
to eliciting incriminating
statements, the suspect has re-
quested and been denied an
opoprtunity to consult with
his lawyer and the police have
not effectively warned him of
his absolute constitutional
right to remain silent, the ac-
cused has been denied 'the
Assistance of Counsel' in viola-
tion of the Sixth Amendment
to the Constitution as 'made
obligatory upon the States. by
the Fourteenth Amendment:
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372
U. S., at 342, 83 S. Ct., at 795,
and that no statement elicited
by the police during the inter-
rogation may be used against
him a t a criminal trial."
Escobedo v. State of Illinois,
378 U. S. 478, 490-491.) In its
conclusion the court stated:
We hold only that when the
process shifts from the in-
vestigatory to accusatory -
when its focus is on the ac-
cused and its purpose is to
elicit a confession - our
adversary system begins to
operate and under the circum-
stances here, the accused must
be permitted to consult with
his attorney. (Id. at p. 492.)"
The facts of the Dorado
case 10 bring' it squarely with-
in the Escobedo rule except
that Dorado did not retain or
request counsel. The question
then in Dorado was whether
the failure of the accused to
retain or request counsel justi-
fies the application of a rule
different from that of Escobe-
do. The court in deciding Esco-
bedo relied a great deal on. the
language of the case of Carn-
ley v. Cochran, 369 U. S. 506,
513 (1962):" ... it is settled
that where the assistance of
counsel is a constitutional
requisite, the right to be fur-
nished counsel does not de-
pend on a request." The court
in Carnley added that "re-
questing counsel" is a "for-
mality upon which ... his
right may not be made to' de-
pend." (Id. at 514.)
Having discussed the fore-
going, the California Supreme
Court in Dorado!l went on to
say:
Thus, say htstorians," in
18th century criminal process,
the trial marked the first
critical point of conrrontatton
between the marshalled forces
of the state and the accused.
A man's liberty was usually
truly won Dr lost at his trial.
Today, criminal trials often
seem like little more than an
appeal from the police interro-
gation.
In the former setting ·the
framers of our constrtution
lavished a dozen specific pro-
visions on the conduct of trial.
In short, the framers were de-
termined to see that trials
were conducted with the ut-
most fairness.
Today, the point of confron-
tation has been pushed back
from the trial to the police
station or before. Thus, Do-
rado was int-errogated without
friend or counsel, in secret,
and not before a jury of his
peers. The officers and the
district attorney elicited the
admissions. The investigation
had already focused, and at
that point of focus, the state's
forces were amassed against
the accused. The writer's pre-
mise is that had the framers
drawn up the constitution
with police force investiga-
tions and interrogations in
mind, the framers themselves
might have specifically pro-
vided rights for the defendant
at what is now the critical
stage of the criminal process.
In spirit they did so provide."
Finally, we must recognize
that the imposition of the
requirement for the request
would discriminate against
the defendant who does not
know his rights. The defend-
ant who does not ask for
counsel is the very defend-
ant who most needs counsel.
We cannot penalize a de-
fendant who, not under-
standing his constrtuttonal
rights, does not make the
formal request and by such
failure demonstrates his
helplessness. To require the
request would be to favor
the defendant whose sophis-
tication or status had for-
tuitously prompted him to
make it.
It is interesting to observe
that two DUt of the three dis-
senting justices agreed with
the above statement. Thus, it
is clear that the Dorado de-
cision is not only supported
but is demanded by the recent
United States' Supreme Court
decisions. By applying the rule
announced in Carnley v. Coch-
ran, we obviate the only dis-
tinction separating the facts
in Escobedo from those in
Dorado. THE DECISION WILL
NOT SERIOUSLY IMPAIR
LAW ENFORCEMENT OR
HANDCUFF THE POLICE IN
THEIR INVESTIGATIONS:
It would be presumptuous if
not absurd to say that the job
of law enforcement will not be
made somewhat more difficult
by the Dorado decision. But
the rule of Escobedo and Do-
rado has been tested and
found workable. It is simply a
change in keeping with our
times. Due Process has always
meant fairness, but our con-
cepts of what is or is not fair
are constantly changing. As
Chief Justice Weintraub so
aptly stated in State v. Smith,
37 N. J. 481, 181 A.2d 761, 762
(1962):
Concepts of justice change.
Doctrines, incomprehensible
today, were once em-
braced by judges who in
6. St. Johns, Final Verdict 92 . (1962).
7. An Historical Argument for the Right
to Counsel During Police Tnt erro gation,
73 Yale L.]. 1000, 1034 (1964).
8. Id. at 1041.
9. The writers historical argument is
largely based on the excellent article
cited in note 7, supra.
10. People v. DOl'ado, 62 A.C. ---,
42 Cal. Rptr. 169, 175 (1965).
11. Id. at 177-178; see also: Escobedo
v. Stale of Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 490
(1964); the concurring opinion of jus-
tice Traynor in People v. Garner, 57
Cal. 2d 135, 165, 18 Cal. Rptr. 40,
58 (1961).
(Continued on page 11)
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stage, sought to eliminate
conditions which invited co-
erced confessions, the ruling
does not require a retroac-
tive application. Second, new
interpretations of constitu-
tional rights have been, and
should be, applied retroac-
tively only in those situ-
ations in which such new
rules protect the innocent
defendant against the possi-
bility of conviction of a
crime he did not commit;
the fact that deefndant was
denied counsel under Esco-
bedo does not affect the is-
sue of guilt. Third, an abso-
lute rule of retroactivity as
to interpretations of consti-
tutional rights which en-
visage the correction of fu-
ture practices would impair
the. administration of crimi-
nal law and ultimately re-
sult in constitutional rigid-
ity. (rd. at 191.)
IN DEFENSE OF DORADO
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their times were doubtless
the epitome of the reason-
able man. Surely this is so in
long-range retrospect. It is
equally true that at the
moment of change the
choice is not necessarily be-
tween dead right and dead
wrong. The judicial scene
is studded with issues upon
which conflicting views
command respectable sup-
port. When a court alters its
course, it is often but a
preference, a belief that jus-
tice is better served in an-
other way, with no intima-
tion that whoever disagrees
must be mean or inane.
Thus the majority of jus-
tices on the Supreme Court
have decided that fairness to
the accused today demands
that he have the right to
counsel at pre indictment in-
terrogation. The court is not
oblivious to the fact that this
will create an added burden
for police and prosecutorial
agencies. It simply decides
that this burden is justified
When balanced against the
rights of an accused who
might otherwise be made to
stand without a buffer be-
tween him and the marshalled
forces of the state.
The United States Supreme
Court performed the balancing
test and the California court
Was forced to follow suit.
Others had adopted the same
standards prior to the rendi-
tion of these decisions and
SUffered no serious impedi-
ments to law enforcement. The
same policy was adopted in
England in 1912 with the pass-
age of the famous Judges'
Rules. These rules provided
that the police could not in-
terrogatean accused and that
on arrest they had to warn
him that any statement he
made might be used against
him.12 In this country, the
FBI has followed the practice
of informing an arrested per-
son of his rights to counsel
and to remain silent at the
outset of an interview." The
Uniform Code of Military Jus-
tice provides that no suspect
may be interrogated without
first being warned of his right
to make a statement and that
his statement may be used
against him.> The United
StJates Court of Military ap-
Peals has reversed at least two
Convictions on the ground that
the suspect was denied the
right to counsel during an in-
vestrgatory interrogation be-
fore his right to counsel had
accrued and before charges
had been filed. (United States
v. Rose, 24 C.M.R. 251 (1957);
United States v, Gunnels, 23
C.M.R. 354 (1957.) It is diffi-
cult to imagine a charge that
our U. S. Military or our F.B.!.
are inefficient in their opera-
tions or hamstrung by having
to work within these rules.
The system has proved not un-
duly restrictive here in Cali-
fornia. According tOoJohn Ne-
[edly, District Attorney of
Contra Costa County, police
officers have advised suspects
of their right to counsel at the
moment the police intended
to arrest and felt that they
had sufficient facts to justify
the arrest=
Experience, then, teaches
that the law enforcement
agencies who have made an
effort to operate within the
rule have not been rendered
ineffective.
While the courts seldom pose
the argument, it seems that
denial of counsel at the
earliest accusatory stage has
long rendered the defendant's
investigation ineffective. The
argument could be made that
the main reason for excluding
from evidence investigatory
results gathered before the op-
portunity to consult with
counsel, is not to prevent the
truth from slipping out. On
the other hand, the defendant,
if we indulge the presumption
of his innocence, may well
ha ve an interest in gathering
evidence of the truth in order
to establish his innocence. It
is well known that evidence of
innocence may be as rleeting
as the evidence of guilt that
prosecutors are in such a
hurry to uncover. Even in the
simplest drunk driving case, a
two hour denial of the right
to counsel may exclude the
possibility of' an accurate
blood test which could prove
innocence. Fingerprints prob-
ably vanish as quickly whether
it is the accused or prosecu-
tion who does the searching.
It is a fact that many crimi-
nals come from the most
transient segment of our so-
ciety where witnesses can slip
away that might have proven
an alibi true. There are no
statistics on how many de-
fendants have gone to prison
because the jury didn't believe
the "missing witness story."
If we persist in maintain-
ing a strict adversary system
of criminal process where
prosecutors are out to win.]
then there ought truly to be
an adversary. The defendant, I
at the earliest possible mo-
ment, needs someone working
wondered how often a police
in his behalf in order to have
a thorough investigation of
his innocence. It can be
investigator is really out
searching for evidence of in-
nocence. Early investigation
is as much the key to crimi-
nal acquital as it is to crimi-
nal conviction. Who knows
what evidence of innocence
has slipped away while the de-
fendant lay helpless in jail? I
Perhaps, by not seeing that
there is a true adversary work-
ing for the deefndant at the
earliest possible moment, the
prosecution makes a fair trial
impossible. The California Su-
preme Court may render such
a holding in the near tuture.ie
The rule has reason which
justifies the increased burden
on law enforcement agencies.
Far from handcuffing the po-
lice, it may unfetter the ac-
cused to meet his monumental
burden of withstanding the
marshalled forces of the
state.
RETROACTIVE??
The reader may take a
moment to ponder over the
legal validity of the attackers
statement that the one glim-
mer of reason in' the Dorado
decision is the court's refusal
to apply the decision retro-
actively on collateral attack.
In In Re Lopez, 62 A.C.-, 42
Cal. Rptr. 188, 190 (1965), Jus-
tice Tobriner writing for a
unanimous court stated the
decision and gave his reasons
as follows:
Whether or not Lopez's in-
criminating statements were
improperly admitted into
evidence under either Mas-
siah or under Escobedo and
Dorado, we hold that Mas-
siah may not serve as the
basis for collateral attack
upon judgments which
have become final before
the date upon which the
United States Supreme
Court rendered that de-
cision, nor may Escobedo or
Dorado be applied to cases
which have become final
prior to the date that the
United . States Supreme
Court rendered the Escobedo
decision.
We reach this conclusion
upon the basis of the three
following propositions . . .:
First, although the United
States Supreme Court in
Escobedo, by providing a
suspect with an opportunity
to obtain the protection of
counsel at the accusatory
The California court, in this
writer's opinion, stands on
shaky ground when it pur-
ports to have exploded the
"splendid myth" of Blackstone
that all constitutional in-
terpretations are eternal veri-
ties that stretch backwards
and forwards to infinity.
While the court's refusal to
apply the decision retroactive-
ly may be eminently reason-
able and warranted in view of
the serious consequences that
would flow from the opposite
decision, it presents real con-
stitutional problems. The as-
sumption has always been
that the constitution never
changes. We may suddenly
discover that what has gone
on for years is unconstItution-
al, but we assume that it was
always unconstitutional and
just never brought to light. If
12. See Williams, Police 1Ilte1'fogat~01l
Privileges and Limitations Under Fareign
Laui: England, 52 Crim. L.C & P.S.
50 (1958). " ' ,
13. Hoover, J. Edgar, CIvil Liberties
and Lata Enforcement: The Role of the
F.B.!. 37 Iowa 1. Rev. 175, 182,
(1952), also Report of the Presidents
Commission on the As sessinetion of
President Kennedy, 619, 612, 625
(1964).
14. 10 U.S.CA. Section 831 (b).
15, Assembly Corn., on Criminal Pl~O-
cedure, San Francisco, July 21, 1964 at
pp 15-16. . .
16, For intimation that such a deCISIOn
is in the offing. see: People v. Hall,
61 A,C --,41 Cal. Rptr. 169 (1964),
especially footnote 8 at p. 289, Largely
due to one sided investigation by po-
lice, this is the first criminal convic-
tion reversed by the California Supreme
Court in 33 years. See also: In re
Imbler, 60 Cal. 2d 554, 567, 35 Cal.
Rptr. 293, (1963) People v. Kiiboa,
53 Cal. 2d 748, 752-754, 3 Cal. Rptr.
1 (1960),
(Continued on page 12)
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peal. The law does not require
useless acts and objections at
trial before these recent cases
the Supreme Court now sud- would surely have been useless.
denly drops this position, will it It would probably not only
nat have :to admit to changing have been unavailing but ac-
the canstitution and thus ad- tually prejudicial to' a de-
mit to legislating? fendant's cause to' raise ob-
jections that he knew fare-
doomed to' be overruled. Per-
haps Dorado will provide the
setting far the United States
Supreme Caurt to air these
unanswered questions.
There is no easy solution.
The writer, despite diligent
search, has nat been able to
unearth a single decision in
which the United States Su-
preme Caurt has failed to
retroactively apply a rule O'f Speaking of Dorado as the
constitutional due process in setting in which rules will be
a criminal case. Indeed, just changed, it is surely only a
the opposite has been true. matter of time until California
Without discussion, the Su- Penal Code Section 851.5 is de-
preme Court has applied retro- clared unconstitutional. This
actively on collateral attack statute presently provides that
its decisions requiring proced- an accused may be interro-
ural fairness at criminal pro- gated far three hours before,
ceedings that vindicated an he is allowed to telephone his
indigent's right to counsel at attorney. The rule is not con-
triap1 and on appeal-s that sistent with F'ourteenth
guaranteed an indigent's right Amendment Due Process as it
to a transcript of the t1'ia1,'"9is now interpreted.
and that imposed more strin-
gent standards tor determin-
ing the voluntarlness of con-
ressions.sv It is true that there
are a host of lower federal
court and upper state court
cases in which retroactivity
has been dented=. These, how-
ever well reasoned, decisions,
do not bind the Supreme
Caurt.
In conclusion ,while there is
roam for intelligent disagree-
ment, the California, Supreme
Court had ample historieal
justificatian and legal prece-
dent for the Dorado decision.
The burden upon prosecutortal
and police agencies is warran-
ted when balanced against the
needs and rights of the ac-
cused. The palice can and
PrO'fessor Freund, in an must learn to operate effec-
otherwise excellent articleP tively and at the same time in-
purparts to cite O'neSupreme form the accused O'fhis consti-
Court criminal case denying tutional rights to consult with
retroactive application, but caunsel and to remain silent.
that may be easily dismissed
as not in point. That case, The ruling will work changes
James- v. United States, 336 in the laws 0'f Califarnia and
U. S. 213 (1961) was a tax; prabably man other jurisdic-
evasion prasecution f0'r failure ·tians. Whether 0'1' not the de-
to' report embezzeled funds as '
incame. The cO'urt had previ- cision must be applied on cal-
ously held that such ill-gotten .lateral attack, remains one af
gain was not income.23 The the legal ponderables of the
caurt overruled its former Darado decisian which may
holding but dismissed James' and shauld receive U. S. Su-
indictment saying his evasion preme Caurt clarificatian.
was not "willful" within the
meaning af the applicable In-
ternal Revenue Cade Sectian.
The case in no way invO'lved
a questian af due pracess and
so is readily distinguishable.
17. Doughty v. Maxwell, 376 U.S. 202
(1964) per curiam; Pickelsimer v,
Wainwright, 375 U.S. 2 (1963) per
curiam; LaVallee v. Durocker, 377 U.
S. 998 (1964).
Thus, thase who caunt on a 18. Smitb v. CfOuse, 378 U,S. 584
nan-retraactive application of (1964) p'er ctt1'iam; Ruark v. State
the rule that police must af- Colorado, 378 U,S. 585 (1964) per
firmatively advise an accused curlam.
19, Eskridge v. Jr'ashingtolZ State Board
of his constitutianal rights, of Prison Terms, 357 U.S. 214 (1958);
may be surprised b a Supreme but see Norvell v, State of Illinois, 373
Court which has long lived an U.S. 420 (1963).
the premise that it merely "?O; f!.eck v, Pate, 367 U.S. 433 (1961).
interprets and daes not amend 21. For a listing of such cases see; In
the constitutian. Surely the re Lopez, 62 A,C.--, 42 Cal. Rptr.
court will not refuse retroactive 188, 195, n. 14 (1965).
22, Freund, New Vistas in Constitution·
applicatian simply because the al Law, 712 U.Pa. L. Rev. 631 (1964).
defendant did not 0'bject at 23. Commissioner v, Wilcox, 327 U.S.
trial or raise the point an ap- 404 (1964).
were presented to the jury
through the agent's testimony.
Reversing the conviction,
cover agents and have defense the Supreme Court, held that
counsel at their side. .the defendant had been de-
Under this new approach one nied his Canstitutianal right
might just as well argue that to the assistance of counsel.
a potential defendant is It was improper tor the trial
constitutionally entitled to a court to' admit into evidence
lawyer before, not arter, he the defendant's incriminating
commits a crime, since it is statements elicited trom the
then that the crucial incrimi- conversation. The agents in-
nating evidence is put within fringed upan the defendant's
the reach of the government." Constitutional rights in fail-
It appears that under the new ing to' forewarn the defendant,
rule an undercover agent at- as a Canstitutianal prerequi-
tempting to gather evidence site to' overhearing the in-
on one particular suspect has criminating conversation, that
reached the point where "the he had a right to summon an
Investigation is no longer a attorney, and a right to re-
general inquiry into an un- main silent.
salved crime, but has begun Beyond undercover agents,
to focus on this particular' the ESCOBEDOand DORADO
suspect." These words were rational has reached dawn as
used by the Court in DORADO far as traffic offenses. In a
to define when the "accusa- traffic court case in Provi-
tory stage" has been reached. dence, the defendant's car·
At this point the undercover collided in a downtown inter-
agent, in order to comply with section with an innocent
his new Constitutional burden, motorist. A policeman asked
must inform the suspect that the defendant if he had
from hence forth everything stopped before proceeding
the suspect says might be used with caution past a flashing
against him, and that he has red trafic light. When the de-
a right to a vlawyer and a fendant said no, the police-
right to remain silent. If the 'man issued an orr-the-spot
undercover agent fans to"thus ticket summons. Because the
inform the criminal or his officer had failed to warn the
rights under the Constitution, defendant that he did not
incriminating statements to have to' answer, and could can-
the agent ar to' any police in- suIt a lawyer, the defendant
former made in the caurse of was released. The defendant's
a canversation with the sus- hanest and frank admissian of
pect will be inadmisible in a guilt was inadmissble evi-
later trial. dence.
The far reaching results af
Daes this sound as thaugh ESCOBEDOand DORADOap-
the new rule were being pear to be by design rather
carried to' an unreasanable than by accident. Justice
extreme? Indeed it may, but White, in his dissent tOiESCO-
this is the extreme that the BEDO, says: "The decision is
caurts are reaching in apply- thus another majar step in
ing the rule. In MASSIAHV. the directian of the goal which
UNITEDSTATES,377U.S. 201, the Court seemingly ,has in
the United States, Supreme mind-to bar from evidence all
Court applied the ESCOBEDO admissians obtained fram an
rational to' reverse the can- individual suspected O'fcrime,
victian of a narcotic peddler. whether invaluntarily made 0'.1'
It was held that· the prase- nO't, Until now there simply
cution cannot introduce intO' has been no right guaranteed
evidence the defendant's "awn by the Federal CO'nstitution to
incriminating wards", which be free fram the use at trial
federal agents had deliberately of a valuntary admission made
elicited fram him "in the prior to' indictment," The Fifth
absence O'fhis attarney." After Admendment to the Constitu-
the defendant's release on tion provided prO'tection
bail, a federal agent arranged against the use 0'f an invO'lun-
with one CalsO'n,whO'had been tary admission, elicited by the
jaintly indicted with the de- police at any time, but it went
fendant, for the installation in no further.
Calsan's car af a radio trans- Now the Caurt, to' attain
niittel'. This device enabled this end result, had expanded
the agent, through a receiving the provisian for caunsel in
selt in a car parked nearby, to' the Sixth Amendment to in
listen to' Colson's conversatian effect supercede the self-in-
with the defendant. Incrimi- criminatian pl'Ovision af the
nating statements O'fthe de- Fifth Amendment. The Fifth
fendant, recarded fram the
canversatian in Colsan's car, (Continued on page 13)
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In DORADO, Justice Mc-
Comb in his dissent points out
that there was "no doubt of
Amendment addresses itself to the guilt of the defendant and
the very issue here in contro- that he was not prejudiced by
versy, use of the defendant's not being advised of his right
incriminating statements in to counsel." The evidence of
trial, and resolves the issue his guilt aside from his in-
by proscribing only compelled criminating admission was
statements. As Justice White overwhelming. Yet the major-
says: "Neither the Framers, ity reversed his conviction,
the Constitutional language, a stating that the use of in-
century of decisions of this criminating statements given
Court nor Professor Wigmore in violation of the right to the
provided an iota of support for accused to an attorney re-
the idea that an accused has sults in a denial of due pro-
an absolute Constitutional cess and requires a reversal
right not to answer even in regardless of other evidence of
the absence of compulsion-the guilt. The majority stressed
Constitutional right not to in- the severity of the death pen-
criminate himself by making alty, but failed to mention
voluntary disclosures, Today's that it is just as, serious a re-
decision cannot be squared sponsibility to. nullify and
with other provisions of the make void a jury finding that
Constitution which, in my Dorado was guilty of murder
view, define the system of in the first degree and should
criminal justice this Court is be punished by execution in
empowered to administer." It the gas chamber.
would seem once again, the
Court is no longer satisfied PEOPLE V. ANDERSON, 62
with the mere administration C. A. ---, decided by our
of the law. It continues. to State Supreme Court the same
legislate it. day DORADO was decided, re-
In order to support its de- versed the conviction a.f the
cision in DORADO, the Court defendant who had brutally
said that it would be putting stabbed a 13 year old girl be-
form over substance to' "make cause she had refused to have
the right to counsel depend sexual intercourse with him.
on whether the authorities Her nude and mutulated body
had secured a formal indict- was found by her 10 year old
ment." But could it not be brother while the defendant.
argued that perhaps the right was attempting to wash the
to counsel in and of itself is girl's spattered blood from his
the form, while the substance arms and hands. The convic-
of our judicial system is to de- tion was reversed because the
termine if a man is truly defendant willingly and free-
guilty of a crime against sn- ly admitted commission of the
ciety, and if he is, to punish crime without being informed
him. The formal objective of of his right to an attorney
the Courts in DORADO and prior to the commencement of
ESCOBEDO is to place upon the questioning. Theincrimi-
law enforcement officials the nating statements were not
Constitutional burden of ad- coerced. The defendants ad-
vising a suspect of his right to missions were true. Yet to pro-
remain silent and right to an teet Anderson's rights, his
attorney. This forewarning conviction was reversed. But
must precede any and all in- what of the. Constitutional
criminating statements made rights of the dead girl and
by the accused, including ~ny what of the Constitutional
incriminating conversation rights of her family? What of
that a police officer or in- the rights of the next 13 year
former may overhear whether old girl to be confronted by
by accident or by design. Mr. Ariderson?
Yet what of the truth of the. PEOPLE V. PECKHAM,
admission and what of the PEOPLE V. CURRY and
guilt of the defendant? The JAMES, and PEOPLE V. POL-
formal objectives of the Court LOCK' all three of these cases
have become so dominant that were reversed within a matter
the truth of the admission is of 48 hours the District Court
irrevelant and the guilt of the of Appeals 'being compelled to
defendant is immaten~l. T?e so do "in the light of the re-
Court "will refuse to inquire cent decision of our Supreme
into the prejudicial nature of Court in PEOPLE V. DOR-
the admissions or into the ADO." In the POLLOCK case,
Weight of the other evidence the defendant had been in the
of guilt." The ,defendant's con- business of defrauding inno-
vtction and prescribed pun- f
ishment must be nullified if cent people of thousands 0
the new rule is violated. dollars. In reversing the con-
viction and punishment, the P.D.P.
Court said: "Suffice it to say (Continued from page 7)
tha t the evidence demon-
strates beyond any reasonable cessful. The hearts of PDP
doubt that the appellant per- were never lighter when they
petrated a bunco scheme." enthusiastically greeted a clan
However, whether the defend- of devastating nurses at a
ant was guilty or not was of beachouse in Playa. Del Rey.
minor importance. Because The event was marred by sev-
the defendant admitted to po- eral incidents, including the
lice officers while driving to commission of a crime; a well
the station that he was guilty executed conspiracy and sub-
and because the officers tak- sequent escape with the good-
ing Pollock to the station ies. But thanks to the gentle-
house had neglected to tell menly conduct of the pledges,
him prior to his admission of I especially Joe. Battaglia,. the
his right to an attorney and !rills were thnlled all night.
to remain silent and because The "model" of behavior was
his admission was a part of Jim Hawkins, who epitomized
the lower court trial, the con- the Aristotelian conception of
viction was reversed. "moderation."
The social seed was planted
There can be no doubt about that night, and Paul Gilbert
it, criminals are being freed and Gary Glausner, with the
for the sake of the new rule. help of many others, chose to
But, the argument goes, we cultivate it into a violent soc-
should design our judicial ial eruption. They charmed an
structure so that not one in- S.C. sorority into coming to a
nocent man be wrongly con- mixer at Paul's old frat. house
victed of a crime, 'even if it on the S.C. campus. The girls
means that 100 guilty men are arrived at 8:30 ready for ac-
set free. The rules should fa- tion and were greeted by all
vor the accused. But it might of 6 frat. members. Everyone
be asked what if 200 guilty else was watching the "Bruin
men are' set free, or 500, or game on the tube. But the
1,000, or to be more precise game finally ended, and ~he
1,700, this being the number guys found time to stomp w:th
of petitions already submitted the girls to the pulsating
to the courts of this state sounds' of the "Housewreck-
alone by men convicted of ers." (we're glad you finally
crimes and now serving sen- found what you were after,
tences in our state peniten- Melone, and don't hesitate to
tiaries. These men are claim- drop in again).
ing that under the DORADO The social juggernaut is
and ESCOBEDO deelsions, they well oiled now and ready to
to? ha_ve been deprived of a go into high gear for our an-
fall' -trtal as. they we:-e ~ever nual cocktail party on March
told of their Constltu~lonal 27 (Thanks Ken). It should
right to an attor?-ey pno,~ to be interesti~g to converse with
their case reaching he ac- the faculty in a different at-
cusatory stage." mosphere.
When weighing the number Some of the more reckless
of innocent men who will members may even be coaxed
escape an unjust. conviction into doing the watusi. The f~a-
due to the new rule against ternity has passed a resolutlOn
the number of innocent per- that it will not settle for the
sons who will suffer at the twist.
hands of criminals released by Th~ ssmester will reach its
the Court's absolute applica- social culmination when the
tion of the new rule to free pledges are installed at the
those unquestionably guilty.the County Courthouse under a
result of ESCOBEDO and DO- very impressive ceremony and
RADO seems to be a step back- feted to a banquet afterwards.
ward. These decisions forget These social engagements
that the purpose or the Con- were. not simply distractioI_!.s
stitution is not limited to the for mentally weary students.
right of a criminal to have an They were the catalysts that
attorney. It's well to remem- generated an "espirit de corps"
bel' that there are other sec- among the pledge class. There
tions of the Constitution be- is a closeness and cohesiveness
sides the Sixth Amendment. among this great bunch of
They tell us this Document guys that is readily apparent
was ordained to "Establish to any observing onlook~r.
justice, insure domestic tran- This feeling. is expressed in
quility, promote the general one word, "fraternalism," and
welfare," and provide for our there is no doubt that the
juggernaut will continue to
roll next year.(Conth~ued on page 16)




THE J.D. VERSUS THE LL.B. AS THE FIRST PROFESSIONAL DEGREE, IN LAW
By John G. Hervey
Reprinted from the February,
1965 issue of Obiter Dicta -
My position is predicated on
logic, policy, analogy and psy-
chology. I favor unqualifiedly
the J.D. degree as the first
professional degree in law for
those who enter law school
with a prior bachelor's degree,
based on the conventional pro-
gram of tour ears 'or-success-
ful 'College work.
Let me say preliminarily that
I take it for granted that my
listeners are familiar general-
ly with the literature - at
least conversant with the very
able presentation of Professor
Marcus Schoenfeld which ap-
peared in the September 1963
issue of the Cleveland-Mar-
shall Law Review and with the
excellen t Report of the AALS
Committee on Graduate Study
on the use of the degree of
Juris Doctor which Report will
be before AALS for action at
this Annual Meeting. Dean
Stanley Samad of the Uni-
versity of Akron has prepared
a splendid paper on this mat-
ter and I have his permission
to' lean hea vily thereon in
what I shall have to say.
Professor Schoenfeld has
painted out well (1) that the
problem is both old and new-
discussed seriously sixty years
ago, revived during the thir-
ties, and now discussed anew;
(2) that '.'the academic de-
gree is.assentially a shorthand
way of signifying that the
holder has completed a speci-
fic course of study at an edu-
cational institution - the de-
grees being divided into bach-
elor's, masters' and doctors';
(3) that professional doctor-
ates, e.g. M.D. and D.D.S., his-
torically have been distin-
guished from "research doc-
torates," e.g. Ph.D., S.J.D.;
(4) that "the nature of basic
professional degrees is that
they carry no implication of
original research qualification,
nor of creation of a substan-
tial addition to existing knowl-
edge"; (5) that once this sys-
tem or heirarchy, of degrees is
und~rstood, many seeming
conflicts are resolved.
One realizes that certain
seeming-issues in fact simply
do not exist except in seman-
tics. They are the result of
applying the language forms
of the prior hierarchy to the
present scheme. Often con-
fusion results from asking the
wrong question."
"The most common erron-
eous question posed is 'Is the
LL.B. equivalent to the Ph.D.?'
or, put another way, 'How can
you call this a doctorate when
there is no research require-
ment?' The fallacy is that one
cannot compare a non-pro-
fessional researcher degree
with a professional degree, any
more than one can compare
apples with oranges. The LL.
B/J.D. is not a Ph.D. But on
the other hand, a Ph.D. is not
an LL.B./J.D. Neither is any
better or worse than the oth-
To debase the LL.B./J.D. be-
cause there is no dissertation
requirement, is essentially
equivalent to saying that the
Ph.D. is inferior to the LL.B./
J.D. because it does not de-
velop a mind trained in legal
method. The nature of the
Ph.D. is that it demands origi-
nal research. The nature of
the LL.B./J.D. is that it de-
velops the analytic legal mind
... So long as one ignores the
fact that there are two kinds
of doctorates - professional
and research-and so long as
the standard to which a first
professional degree must be
compared is the Ph.D., no first
professional degree can be a
doctorate. However, this does
not correspond with reality, as
the M.D. and D.D.S. would be
excluded . . . Only when we
free our minds from the erro-
neous notion that all doctor-
ates must be the same can we
proceed to choose between the
L.L.B. and J.D. on a proper
basis."
The fact is that 55 of the
A.B.A. approved law schools
now require a baccalaureate
degree for admission. The fur-
ther fact is that 25 of the said
schools presently confer the
J.D. degree. The final fact
emerges that the great ma-
jority of schools which require
a degree for admission confer
the LL.B. This latter fact is
said to be attributable (1) to
the anomalous development of
legal education in the U. S.,
(2) to tr.aditionalism (so-call-
ed) in the schools (3) to the
non-conferral of the J.D. by
the schools commonly regard-
ed as leaders in legal educa-
tion. Some of the latter equate
their LL.B. degree to a doc-
torate. The Harvard Law
School, for example, which re-
quires a prior college degree
for admission, does not confer
the J.D., it was so recom-
mended by the faculty but ve-
toed by the corporation) but
adds prestige to its LL.B. de-
gree by robing the graduates
in doctoral gowns and assign-
ing them rank between the
candidates for masters' and
research doctors' degrees in
the academic procession.
I would be perfectly willing
to defend, if time permitted,
the thesis that the LL.B. can
be equated today to the Ph.D.
in many fields. It so happens
that I hold the LL.B. from
what I would classify as no
more than a second rate law
school (the University of Okla-
homa) and the Ph.D. from an
Ivy League institution (the
University of Pennsylvania). I
have had an educational ex-
perience that most of you have
not had. I can bear personal
testimony that the work which
was exacted of me for my LL.
B. in a second-rate law school,
both intensively and exten-
tensively, exceeded that re-
quired for my Ph.D. (research
doctorate) in any Ivy League
university. And that is true
notwithstanding the foreign
language requirements for the
Ph.D.
The content of the Ph.D. in
many fields in the run-of-the-
mill institution, as I view it,
has been so downgraded that
it is litle more today than an
endurance test. It must be
hurdled successfully in order
to acquire that "union card"
which is so necessary for pro-
fessorial advancement in the
"educational shop." But that
is another matter for another
day. Let us get to the subj ect
at hand.
The J.D. is the logical de-
gree. As the late Professor
Beale and Dean Sam ad have
pointed out,.it is absurd to
award a second bachelor's de-
gree, the LL.B. for advanced
professional work, to those
who already hold a first
bachelor's degree. This more
especially when admission is
based on standards that equal
or exceed those of the gradu-
ate school or the other pro-
fessional divisions of the par-
ent institution. The usual a-
mount of college work re-
quired is three years for medi-
cine and dentistry; two years
for veterinary medicine and
osteopathy, and one year for
chiropody and optometry.
Practioners in these profes-
sional areas hold professional
doctorates-D.D., D.D.S., D.M.
V. etc. If graduates of schools
of medicine, dentistry, oste-
opathy, veterinary medicine,
chiropody and optometry,
none of which must have a
bachelor's degree for admis-
sion, are to receive profes-
sional doctorates, why should
the law schools lag behind?
It simply does not make sense.
The J.D. should be confer-
red as a matter of policy. Law
study involves tough, intel-
lectual materials. It involves
the highest mental capacities
in terms of ability to think
deeply, critically and creatively.
The same values and attend-
'ant problems and study that
concern the philosopher, po-
litical scientist, sociologist,
and economist concern the
law student-the appreciation
of values in a democratic so-
Ciety and human dignity in
a free and affluent SOCiety.
As a matter of analogy, I
need remind you only of the
"professional doctorates" in
the field of medicine, dentist-
ry, and other fieIds heretofore
indicated. These fields furnish
adequate precedents for a-
warding a "proresstonat doctor-
ate" as the first degree' in a
professional field to the study
of which the student brings a
prior' college degree. Bear in
mind, if you will, that the
great majority of the schools
In other professional fields do
not require a prior college de-
gree for admission. Neverthe-
less, the graduates are award-
ed "professional doctorates"
regardless of whether they en-
tered with a prior college de-
gree.
As a matter of psychology,
I believe Sincerely that award-
ing the J.D. will heighten the
image of the law school in
the minds of general universi-
ty administrators and boards
of control. In journeying about
the country and visiting law
SChDOls,time and time again,
in institutions in which the
medical school gets preferred
treatment, these people have
said to me: "Why should the
law school be preferred over
undergraduate divisions of our
institution? After all, the work
leads only to a bachelor's de-
gree." The fact is that those
who allocate the funds among
the several divisions of an in-
stitution think of the law
school simply as "another un-
degraduate division" and act
accordingly. The president of
one institution of which I am
(Continued on page 15)
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(Continued from page 14) terparts are addressed as
. . "Doctor." Our government
a for~e~, de~n sal.d. qUl~e lawyers in foreign countries
~ra~kly : A. pi oressor in this are downgraded in esteem and
Institution IS a professor. I respect when they hold the
?on't car~ whether he is teach- LL.B. only and their adversar-
mg Engl1sh, mathematics or ies hold the doctorate
law. They will be treated alike. You may as well ask: "Wh'a,t
No preference will be given to
those who instruct in the law are the arguments against the
school." His predecessor, at the J.D. degree? Your presenta-
time I had been engaged, had tion sounds reasonable. Why
promised that law school sal- don't we do it?" The so-called
aries could be geared to the arguments against it fall into
medical school scale. Boards of several categories. First: it is
control and university admin- argued that the law degree
istrators, when they come to should not be called a "doc-
the allocation of funds to the torate" because there is no
medical schools, not to men- specific research requirement.
tion the departments of bio- This objection simply discloses
logical or physical sciences at the lack of understanding of
the present moment, usually the inquirer-he does not un-
are non parsimonious. derstand the difference be-
The basic problem of the tween the "professional" and
law schools, other than moti- the "research" doctorates,
vation, at the moment, is lack There is no research require-
of adequate funds. They need ment for the M.D., D.D.S., D.
and are entitled to more mon- .M., D.O., or D.V.M. Members
ey. I know that many law of many boards of control of
school ::j.dministrators have la- law schools simply are not
bored hard to educate those aware of the distinction be-
Who provide and allocate the tween "professional" and "re-
funds. Some have become dis- search" doctorates. They need
couraged and have resigned. education on the point.
Awar'dirig the J.D. degree It is argued also that award-
would, in my humble opinion, ing the J.D. will discourage re-
induce university presidents search degrees in law-it will
and boards of control to think downgrade the J.S.D. and S.
of their law schools as gradu- J.D. degrees. There is no proof
ate or professional divisions that this has been true in the
and equate them with the past. My guess would be that
medical schools. It would help the percentage of graduates of
to overcome the common prac- the University of Chicago Law
tice of regarding the law School" which has conferred
school as "just another bache- the J.D. for many years, who
lor's degree" divisions. have gone on for the research
Finally, the J.D. degree is doctorates in law compares
necessary to equate posture of favorably with that of any
lawyers who enter govern- school which confers the LL.
merit service. The fact is that B. Horeover, the conferral of
some government agencies, the M.D. in medicine or the
both federal and state, allo- D.D.S. in dentistry has not
cate a larger number of points, downgraded the research de-
for purposes of salary increases grees in those fields-Master
and promotions, to holders of of Anesthesiology, Master of
the J.D. than to holders of the Biogradiology. Master of Den-
LL.B. The holder of the J.D. tal Surgery, Doctor of Medical
degree "gets there firstest with Science, Master of Gynecology
the mostest" both in salary and Obstetrics, Master of 1'11-
and rank because governmen- ternal Medicine, Master of
tal agencies discriminate be- Optometry, Doctor of Medical
tween holders of the J.D. and SCience, and Master of Medi-
the LL.B. Admittedly this is cal Science.
unfair to the lawyers in gov- lt is argued moreover that
ernrnerit service who entered the traditional degree is the,
law school with prior college LL.B. This argument rests on
degrees but who, upon gradu- where one starts with "tradi-
ation from law school received tion." The LL.B. appears to
the LL.B. Moreover, one should have been an innovation of
not forget that there are many the English-the term "Bache-
lawyers in government serv- Ier of Lawe" appears in the
ice who are stationed in Lat- works of Chaucer (about
in America and Europe. There 1386). The reference is obscure
are no less than 1,000 lawyers because English university
in: the Army J.A.G. These are education in law dates back
stationed at bases around the only a century. In England to-
globe. It is embarrassing to day those who study under a
these lawyers to be addressed law faculty receive a B.A. or
B.C.L. or B.L. or LL.B. depend-
ing upon the length of the
period of study and the par-
ticular university attended.
My study of the traditional
degree carries me back to
Bologna which is reputed to
have conferred the first de-
grees. The first faculty there
dated back to 1088. Its first
degrees were in law-a doc-
torate in law. The teachers of
Roman and Comparative Law
will recall Inerius of Bologna
and his teachings of the Ro-
man Law following the dis-
covery of the Code Justinian.
Subsequently, Bologna, con-
ferred doctorates in divinity,
medicine, grammar, logic, and
philosophy in addition to the
doctorate in civil and canon
law. Thus it is that tradition
is not against the J.D. degree.
The so-called tradition of
the LL.B. degree developed at
the time when law study
moved from the law offices to
the law schools. At that time
there was no requirement of
prior college work for admis-
sion to the law schools and,
in many schools, the program
of law study covered only two
years. In 1906, for example, 96
schools conferred the LL.B.
degree. But 48 of the 96 re-
quired a high school educa-
tion for admission although
the period of law study cov-
ered three years. In 32 other
schools which awarded the L
L.B., the period of law study
covered only two years. More-
over, 16 others of the 96 had
a period of law study of three
years but admitted for study
persons with less than high
school education. Such was
the so-called tradition as it
had developed in American le-
gal education by 1906. I re-
spectfully submit that it is not
a tradition which is worthy of
emulation in 1963 for the
graduates of approved schools
who enter upon their law
studies with a college degree
in the arts or sciences.
Some argue that inasmuch
as the J.D. is not now awarded
by Ivy League schools in the
East, it should not replace the
LL.B. "Let us await adoption
first by those schools" runs
the argument. There ar'e many
answers to this. One weakness
of the non-Ivy League schools
has been their unwillingness
to blaze "new trails." Legal
education in America has been
altogether too much "copy-
cat." Many mid-western
schools, such as Chicago and
Northwestern to mention only
two, have conferred the J.D.
degree for many years. Their
reputations are just as re-
spectable as those of the Ivy
League schools. I honestly be-
lieve that if one of the leading
eastern schools, e.g. N.Y.U.,
Columbia, Yale or Harvard,
should change to the J.D. at
least fifty other schools would
make like changes in twelve
months. If awarding the J.D.
be justifiable on grounds of
logic, policy, analogy, and psy-
chology, let us forget what the
Ivy Leaguers do.
lt is argued that awarding
the J.D. will make for diffi-
culty in classifying the degree.
"Will the J.D. be an 'under-
graduate' or a 'graduate' de-
gree," so runs the argument.
The answer is, of course, that
it is neither. It is a "first pro-
fessional degree in law." The
difficul ty here would be no
different or greater than in
classifying the M.D., D.O., D.
D.S., or D.V.M. A pattern of
classification already has been
established for programs of
professional schools and classi-
fication presents no obstacle.
It is argued by some that it
will be difficult to process any
recommendation for such a
change in the degree through
the hierarchy of committees,
etc. in the parent institution
of which' the law school is an
integral part. The argument is
that degrees are conferred by
the parent institution and not
by the law school and thus
any change in the degree
would require favorable action
by the University Senate and
such committees thereof as
may have jurisdiction. Such
situations do exist. It is un-
fortunate, in my judgment,
that any law school faculty
should not have open lines of
communication directly to the
president and board of control
of any institution which op-
erates a law school. Even so,
I cannot believe that either
Senate or faculty committees
in any institution worthy of
a law school would veto a pro-
posal which rests on logic and
sound grounds of policy, anal-
ogy and psychology, if the law
faculty be ready to undertake
the education necessary
among their collegiate associ-
ates. lt may require hard work
in some institutions but that
is no reason to be faint-heart-
ed. Assuredly the fact that
such a recommendation would
have to mount hurdles of rac-'
ulty hierarchy in some insti-
tutions is no-reason for failure
to act in those institutions
(Continued on page 16)
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society "protection under the
law," protection from Dorado,
Escobedo, Anderson, Pollock,
etc. A decision such as Dorado
"may" protect one innocent
man while letting thousands
of guilty men free 'to prey
.upon their defenseless victims.
It is simply a weighing process.
As of now, the scales of jus-
tice 'are weighted heavily in
favor of the criminal .The
time has come for them to re-
gain their equilibrium.
BECKER RETIR'ES
Professor Jacob J. Becker
has announced that he will re-
tire at the end of the current
term. Professor Becker has
taught Corporation, Negoti-
able Instruments, Mortgages
and Legal Ethics at Loyola
since he joined the faculty in
1935.Hewas Acting Dean from
1937through 1941.He was the
founding father of the Loyola
chapter of Phi Delta Phi, Ag-
geler Inn. .
He will easily be remember-
ed by the faculty, alumni and
his present students. The rea-
son why? Because-the com-
prehensive coverage of the
courses, the hints on future
courtroom behavior (or "what
are you going to tell the
judge?), reminders to leave a
.Iittle earlyto allow for traffic
mishaps, and the Becker-
Goldie Debate.
He leaves a legacy of well
taught students who have a
universal regard for a gentle-
man, teacher, a lawyer. He rs
undeniably a part of the
Loyola Law School tradition
that did not cease to exist
when the structure at 1137
South Grand was razed.
LOYOLA
TIME FOR A CHANGE-






The American Law Students The first installment of thl
Association program on Ad- recently initiated Noon Lee
vocacy was held Saturday, ture Series was presented Feb
Feb. 27, in the Loyola John ruary 24 in the Loyola Johr
F. Kennedy Moot Court Room. F. Kennedy Moot Court Roo
The event was under the Speaker at the auspiciou
chairmanship of Charles Jones, beginning lecture was Bernar]
President of the Loyola stu- E. Witkin of the San Fran!
dent Bar Association. cisco Bar and author of til
The presentation was highly regarded tomes on Cal"
through a panel consisting of fornia Evidence, Procedure
tl~e leaders of the California Civil and Criminal Law. J
trial bar, Joseph A. Ball and] Mr. Witkin focused his a
RaoulD. Magana, and panel- tention on the intricacies an
ist-moderator Justice otto nuances of jurisdictional pro
Kaus of the Appellate Court,of lems with a seven-phase e)!
California, Second Circuit. amination of the subject.
These gentlemen discussed' The series are open to prac
advocacy at the various stages tieing attornies, Uriiverslty (
of the trial process, consider- Southern California and Uni
ing problems in connection versity of California at La
with voir dire, opening state- Angeles law students as we
merit, presentation of evi- as the Loyola Law School st
dence, examination and cross- dents.
examination of witnesses, ob-
jections and final arguments. DIBBLE"SA'BBATICAL
Their solutions were as
varied as the many situations Dean J. Rex Dibble began
encountered but their one six month sabbatical leav
overriding criterion was the starting In February. He wi
same-that of good taste. devote much of this time to
Members of the bar, Uni.- paper on certain aspects (
versity of Southern California free speech.
and University of California In the interim Lloyd T'ev
at LosAngeles law students in I is the Acting Dean and Donal
addition to Loyola students, Cowen is the Acting Associai
were in attendance. Dean.
where the hierarchy does not
exist.
In summary, let me conclude
as I began. I personally favor
unequivocally awarding the
J.D. degree to those graduates
of approved law schools who
hold prior bachelor's degrees
based on the conventional pro-
gram of four years of college
work. That is my personal
opinion and does not repre-
sent the official position of the
Council of the Section, the
Board of Governors or the
House of Delegates of A.B.A.
You know already, however
that at the Annual Meeting of
A.B.A. in the year 1906 the
Committee on Legal Education
recommended the adoption of
a resolution favoring the J.D.
degree for those "who have
previously obtained a degree
in arts or science." There has
been, so far as I can discover
in reading the annual Reports
of A.B.A.,no retreat from that
position. The position of the
committee on Legal Education
of 1906 and my position are
based on logic, policy, anal-
ogy, and psychology.
I strongly recommend that
the matter receive the earnest
consideration of every approv-
ed law school. I believe sin-
cerely that awarding the J.D.
Degree as the first profession-
al degree in law to those who
enter law school with a prior
college degree will upgrade the
law schools in the eyes of the'
public and in the considera-
tion given to law schools by
boards of control and universi-
ty administrators, all of which
will redound to the credit of
the proression, the improve-
ment of the law schools, and
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